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The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism
in an Age of National Political Parties
David Schleicher ∗
Despite it being the constitutional amendment that most directly altered the structure of
the federal government, little is known about how and why the Seventeenth Amendment
was enacted. Existing scholarship on why the Constitution was amended to require direct
elections for U.S. Senators, rather than having them appointed by state legislatures, has
troubled accounting for two major puzzles. Why were state legislatures eager to give away
the power to choose Senators? And why was there virtually no discussion of federalism
during debates over removing a key constitutional protection for states governments?
This Article offers a theory that can provide an answer to both of these questions. Support
for direct elections was, at least in part, a result of the rise of ideologically coherent,
national political parties. The rise of truly national parties meant that state legislative
elections increasingly turned on national issues, as voters used these elections as means to
select Senators. State politicians and interest groups supported direct elections as a way of
separating national and state politics. Advocates of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment
claim the mantle of federalism, but repeal would reduce the benefits of federalism,
making state legislatures into something akin to electoral colleges for U.S. Senators.
While important in its own right, the history of the Seventeenth Amendment can also
teach us a great deal about how federalism functions in eras of strong national political
parties. First, national political parties have not generally served as “political safeguards
of federalism,” but instead have made state politics turn on national issues. Second,
despite the Seventeenth Amendment, state elections still largely turn on national politics.
Although state issues are sometimes important, the most important factor in state
legislative elections is the popularity of the President. To achieve the benefits for state
democracy sought by supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment, election law reform
would be more effective than structural constitutional changes.
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Introduction
For a brief moment in 2010, the Seventeenth Amendment suddenly
and surprisingly became news. Before the Seventeenth Amendment gave
each state’s citizens the power to directly elect U.S. senators, state
1
legislatures had the power to appoint them. After years of being a niche
2
cause for a few legal scholars and fringe political activists, repealing the

1. The Constitution originally read: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have
one Vote.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment changed this
provision to read: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors
in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures.” U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
2. The leading scholars pushing repeal were (now Judge) Jay Bybee, C.H. Hoebeke, and Todd
Zywicki. See, e.g., C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the
Seventeenth Amendment (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the
Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1997); Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond
the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for
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Seventeenth Amendment became popular among Tea Party figures and
3
Republican candidates for office. Prominent conservative figures like
Texas Governor Rick Perry, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and
4
columnist George Will came out in favor of repeal. The movement to
repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, once well outside of the popular
mainstream, was hot.
And then it went cold, with attention dying down and no legislative
5
6
action, despite several proponents of repeal getting elected to Congress.
But this upsurge in attention to the Seventeenth Amendment—and the
continuing support for repeal in Congress and beyond—raises one of the
great, unanswered questions in constitutional history: Why did we take
away from state legislatures the power to select senators, which James
Madison described in The Federalist No. 62 as so “congenial with the
7
public opinion” that it was “unnecessary to dilate?”
The academic literature has struggled with this question, pointing to
explanations that are, at best, incomplete or too weak to explain the
passage of an constitutional amendment. Most problematically, existing
theories explain little about the central puzzle in the historical record: state

Current Reform Proposals, 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 165 (1997) [hereinafter Zywicki, Beyond the Shell];
Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 73 Or. L. Rev. 1007 (1994) [hereinafter Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests]. For a
discussion of support for repeal among political activists, see Kevin Drum, Repeal the 17th
Amendment!, Mother Jones (Aug. 15, 2011, 5:17 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/
2011/08/repeal-17th-amendment (discussing long-term support for repeal in John Birch Society and
others on the “fringe of movement conservatism”).
3. See Alex Seitz-Wald, Repeal the 17th Amendment! The Surprising Republican Movement to
Strip Voters of Their Right to Elect Senators, Salon (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.salon.com/
2012/08/16/repeal_the_17th_amendment (noting support among Tea Party activists, leading figures
like Justice Scalia and Gov. Perry, and candidates for office); George F. Will, Editorial, Sen. Feingold’s
Constitution, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 2009, at A19 (supporting repeal).
4. See Seitz-Wald, supra note 3. It even became a campaign issue, with several Democrats running
ads criticizing Republican candidates for supporting repeal. See Greg Sargent, Can Dems Use Tea Party
Against GOP on 17th Amendment?, Wash. Post: Plum Line (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:46 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/09/can_vulnerable_dems_teabag_gop.html (describing
Democratic attack ads based on Republican candidate’s support for repeal); Will, supra note 3.
5. Dying down, but not dead. For instance, Mark Levin’s book The Liberty Amendments, calling
for repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, was a New York Times number one best seller in 2013.
Best Sellers: Combined Print & E-Book Nonfiction, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2013, at 24 (book review);
Mark R. Levin, The Liberty Amendments: Restoring the American Republic (2013). Senator Ted
Cruz criticized the Seventeenth Amendment in a tweet in 2012. Ted Cruz, Twitter (Jan. 12, 2012,
6:06 PM), https://twitter.com/tedcruz/status/157644774369792000 (“17th Amendment was one of the
structural changes pushed by progressives that pushed power to Washington and weakened the States.”).
6. In 2010, the most notable supporter elected was Senator Michael Lee. Support for repeal was
still alive in campaigns in 2012, when it was endorsed by at least four Republican candidates for Senate—
Todd Akin, Jeff Flake, Peter Hoekstra, and Richard Mourdock. See Seitz-Wald, supra note 3 (noting
support from Akin, Mourdock, Flake, and Hoekstra, and support among several elected officials
including Senator Lee). Among these repeal supporters, only Flake was elected. See Ken Belson et al.,
Northeast, South, Midwest, West, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2012, at A16 (discussing election results).
7. The Federalist No. 62, at 377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

I - Schleicher_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete)

1046

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/26/2014 10:46 AM

[Vol. 65:1043

legislators, state-based interest groups, and political figures committed to
states’ rights in other contexts did little to contest a constitutional
8
amendment that removed a substantial power from state legislatures. In
fact, the direct election of U.S. senators was wildly popular among state
9
legislators, the very people it disempowered. Thirty-one state legislatures
passed resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment providing for
direct elections, and many passed resolutions calling for a constitutional
10
convention if an amendment was not enacted. In a number of states, a
form of direct elections had already been implemented before the passage
of the Seventeenth Amendment through a clever ballot rule known as the
11
“Oregon system.”
Further, the debates over the Seventeenth
Amendment in Congress included minimal discussion of any potential
negative implications for federalism despite it removing a substantial
12
power from state officials. As Alan Grimes notes, no amendment has so
“fundamentally altered the design of the original structure of the
government,” but scholars have still yet to answer even the most basic
13
questions about the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.
This Article argues that contemporary Seventeenth Amendment
scholarship has ignored a major change in American political life
concurrent with the movement supporting direct elections for U.S.
senators: the rise of truly national political parties. The combination of
having state legislatures appoint senators and the increasing
nationalization and ideological coherence of the major parties at the turn
of the last century ensured that state legislative elections were
fundamentally about national politics. Voters used state legislative
elections to choose senators rather than hold state legislators accountable
for their performance in office. The movement for direct elections of
senators was driven in part by a perceived need—by state politicians,
voters, and interest groups powerful in state politics—to save elections at
14
the state level from becoming mere proxies for national political conflict.
This Article offers both a theoretical argument for why changes in the
party system likely had this effect and historical evidence that shows that
at least some supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment saw the direct
election of senators as a method of preserving state democracy. The fear
that state democracy was under threat was not the only reason the
8. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (showing high levels of support for the
Seventeenth Amendment in state legislatures).
9. Id.
10. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
12. There was a substantial debate over state rights and the Seventeenth Amendment, but it was
not about direct election of senators. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. It was instead about
whether the Seventeenth Amendment should include a change to the Elections Clause of Article I. Id.
13. Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 2 (1978).
14. See infra Part II.C.
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Seventeenth Amendment passed, but it was an important factor in
explaining this substantial constitutional change (and one largely ignored
in today’s debates over repeal).
Although the history of the Seventeenth Amendment is interesting
in its own right, it is particularly important because it can teach us a great
deal about how federalism works today, as our political parties are now
more ideologically coherent, national in form, and polarized than ever
15
before. While there is an enormous literature debating the benefits and
costs of federalism, most legal scholarship and judicial opinions in the
field are premised on a belief that increasing the autonomy of state
policymaking power provides a set of benefits, from allowing citizens “to
vote with their feet” by moving between states with different policies to
promote “laboratories of democracy” to giving power to governments
16
that are more responsive to popular opinion. These benefits can then be
balanced against the benefits of national resolution of certain issues. But
17
virtually all the normative justifications for “Our Federalism” —varied
though they are—turn on the ability of state citizens to use elections to
express preferences about state policies and hold state officials
accountable. To the extent that a constitutional or legislative change
makes it harder for state residents to use the apparatus of their state
government to achieve policy ends, it should be considered a move away
from realizing the benefits of federalism. That is, leaving certain powers
to states can reduce the benefits of federalism. The original Constitution’s
delegation of the power to choose U.S. senators was a substantial power
held by state legislatures. However, as a result of the increasing
nationalization of political parties at the turn of the last century, having
state legislatures make these appointments reduced the capacity of state
elections to serve as a tool for voters to judge the performance of state
officials. The change to direct elections of senators was thus a move
toward achieving the normative benefits that we associate with federalism.
Modern proponents of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment
claim the mantle of federalism, but they have the case almost entirely
backwards. Rather than serving to enhance the values of federalism,
repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would ensure that state
legislative elections turned on the popularity of U.S. senators. This is
only “pro-federalism” if one’s view of federalism is purely formal, a
counting up of official powers and responsibilities. To the extent that one
cares about the benefits that flow from having a federal system, repealing
the Seventeenth Amendment would be harmful.
15. See infra notes 207–211 and accompanying text.
16. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory.”).
17. The term “Our Federalism” was coined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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However, the pro-federalism story of the Seventeenth Amendment
has an ironic end. Even after the Seventeenth Amendment, voters in
state legislative elections continue to respond mostly to national rather
than state inputs, leaving state legislatures largely unaccountable and
unrepresentative. While repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would
make this worse, the single most important factor in determining which
party wins state legislative elections today is the popularity of the
18
President. The vast majority of voters who favor President Obama, for
example, are likely to vote for Democrats in state legislatures with little
attention paid to the actual performance of incumbent state legislators or
the position taken by their challengers.
This is largely a function of the fact that the parties on the ballot—
Democrats and Republicans—are national in scope. The national parties
face legal and practical hurdles in their efforts to create differentiated state
party brands that state voters understand as as distinct from their national
parents. They are, as I have argued in previous work, “mismatched” to the
level of government, leaving voters without informative party labels to
help them overcome their lack of knowledge about individual legislative
19
candidates. While candidates for governor or mayor are sufficiently high
profile that they sometimes create their own brand in the eyes of voters
and win races in states and localities in which their party traditionally
20
does not succeed, state legislative parties cannot do the same.
The failures of party democracy at the state level are an important
limitation on the functioning of American federalism. Contrary to Larry
Kramer’s well-known claim, rather than serving as “political safeguards
of federalism,” interaction between state and national political parties
can serve to reduce the benefits that flow from protecting state authority
21
under the Constitution. To achieve the pro-federalism ends of the
18. See Steven Rogers, Accountability in a Federal System: How Parties Perform in Office and
State Legislative Elections 22–24 (2012) (unpublished Job Market paper), available at
http://www.thebrokenwindow.net/papers/R/Rogers-JobMarketPaper-Web.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance,
Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (2013) (analyzing mismatch); David
Schleicher, What if Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 109 (2011)
[hereinafter Schleicher, What if Europe] (discussing mismatch in European Parliament elections);
David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of
Election Law, 23 J.L. & Pol. 419 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, City Council Elections] (arguing that
there are mismatch problems in city council elections).
20. See, e.g., Jill Colvin, The Tall Man Cometh: Bill de Blasio Will Bring His Own Brand of
Leadership to City Hall, Politicker (Oct. 29, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://politicker.com/2013/10/the-tallman-cometh-bill-de-blasio-will-bring-his-own-brand-of-leadership-to-city-hall (discussing New York
City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s approach to campaigning).
21. The two central figures in developing the theory (or rather theories) of the “political
safeguards of federalism” are Larry Kramer and Herbert Wechsler. See Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1523–24 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism]
(arguing that state-based political parties and the ability of states to interact with federal
administrators protects federalism); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
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Seventeenth Amendment, reformers would need to come up with
methods for making state policies more visible to state voters when they
enter the voting booth. Changes to election laws are more likely than
constitutional amendments to increase the degree to which state elections
turn on the performance and policy positions of state officials and
candidates.
As voluminous as it is, contemporary scholarly and public debates
about federalism rarely focus on how well state democracy actually
works. The history of the Seventeenth Amendment shows that this was
not always the case. But today’s scholars, jurists, and politicians generally
focus on the powers of states and their independence from federal
encroachment (and in particular on the Supreme Court’s resolution of
these questions), or alternatively on cooperation between state and
federal officials in administering jointly-run programs, but ignore larger
questions about the success or failure of popular representation at the
state level. Furthermore, state democracy is not healthy, as it fails to
produce policy outcomes that are representative of popular preferences.
For example, a leading study shows that, at the state level, “[r]oughly
half the time, opinion majorities lose—even large supermajorities prevail
less than 60% of the time. In other words, state governments are on
average no more effective in translating opinion majorities into public
22
policy than a simple coin flip.” The problems of state democracy raise
important questions about existing theories of federalism, such as: How
many inventions do our “laboratories of democracy” actually create?
How many different policy options do the fifty states provide to mobile
residents? Our understanding of these theories would be well served by
looking beyond the arguments at One First Street and into the elections
that choose the people who run state governments in Albany and
Richmond, in Columbus and Sacramento.
Part I of this Article analyzes the history of state legislative
appointment of senators from the founding period to the enactment of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Part II argues that changes in the centralization
and ideological coherence of national political parties can help explain why
there was little state-government-based opposition to the Seventeenth
Amendment. Part III argues that the history of the Seventeenth
Amendment has important implications for the literature on the political
safeguards of federalism and on the study of federalism generally.

Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 269 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back] (same); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546, 558–59 (1954)
(arguing that the structure of the federal government protects federalism).
22. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 148, 149 (2012).
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I. Appointing Versus Electing Senators from the Founding
Period to the Seventeenth Amendment
This Part explores the history of arguments over methods of
appointment for senators from the founding period through passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment. As it will show, the existing literature has had
difficulty explaining the rise of support for directly electing U.S. senators.
A. The Founders and Senatorial Appointment
The Citizens of the States would be represented both individually and
collectively.
23
—James Madison

In order to understand what was missing from the debates over the
Seventeenth Amendment, it is necessary to understand why the original
Constitution gave state legislatures the power to appoint U.S. senators.
In The Federalist No. 62, James Madison stated two reasons for giving
state legislatures the power to appoint senators:
Among the various modes which might have been devised for
constituting this branch of the government . . . . [i]t is recommended by
the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to
the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal
government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form
24
a convenient link between the two systems.

State legislatures were thus given the power to appoint senators for two
reasons: to ensure “select” representation, and to protect the interests of
the states. The former can be seen in many aspects of the design of the
25
Senate, particularly its six-year terms. The Founders justified their
decision to give state legislatures the power to choose senators in part to
remove the decision from mass democratic consideration and put the
26
decision in elite hands.
It is a mistake, however, to look at state legislative selection only as
a means of insulating government from popular opinion. After all, the
Constitutional Convention considered and rejected other possible ways
of selecting the Senate that were equally removed from the popular vote,
27
including having the House select the membership of the Senate. The
other side of the “double advantage” was also central to the decision.
George Mason defended state legislative selection on the ground that

23. James Madison, Debates of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 163 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1845).
24. The Federalist No. 62, supra note 7, at 377.
25. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 180–82.
26. The Federalist No. 62, supra note 7, at 377.
27. Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court,
and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 674 (1999) (noting that the Convention
considered and rejected a resolution proposing that the members of the House select the Senate).
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states needed the power of self-defense against the federal government.
The Senate was clearly seen as the protector of state interests.
But senators were not intended to serve as ambassadors of state
governments either. The Convention rejected proposals that would have
given state governments control over senators, including the power to
recall senators or punish them for ignoring the instructions of state
29
legislatures. Senators from the same state were allowed to disagree,
which is inconsistent with the idea that they served as agents of state
governments. Further, the Constitution did not allow state governments
as sovereign entities to decide how they would select senators; the power
to appoint was explicitly delegated to state legislatures, who were seen as
30
the bodies with the greatest democratic pedigree.
Thus, State legislative selection of senators was not only a method
of protecting states as entities; it was also a way to increase the types of
31
representation afforded by the federal government to the people.
William Pierce, a delegate from Georgia, made this point at the
Convention when he said that the division of bicameral legislature into
national and federal bodies meant that “the Citizens of the States would
32
be represented both individually and collectively.” Bicameralism based
on different sources of electoral accountability would also protect against
33
dominance by one faction.
These benefits were crucial in public justifications of senatorial
appointment. In Federalist No. 39, Madison emphasized that both houses
of Congress had democratic purchase, but of different sorts. He noted that
the “House of Representatives . . . is elected immediately by the great
body of the people. The Senate . . . derives its appointment indirectly from
34
the people.” Thus, both have democratic pedigree, if of a different sort.
Then, he continued:

28. George H. Haynes, American Public Problems: The Election of Senators 13 (Ralph
Curtis. Ringwalt, ed., 1906) (quoting George Mason’s arguments for the popular election of senators).
29. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1508.
30. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913).
31. This understanding of the decision to have state legislatures select Senators clears up one
seeming contradiction in the Framer’s beliefs about the Senate. See Kramer, supra note 29, at 1508
(“The Senate was designed to serve contradictory ends. On the one hand, it was supposed to protect
states by giving state legislatures an effective veto over federal policy. On the other hand, it was also
supposed to serve as a republican analogue to the aristocratic House of Lords by taking the longer,
more ‘national’ view of policy.”). However, if one considers the Senate as providing a different form of
representation, one in which through deliberation they came to the best interests of the nation as a
compact between states, this seeming contradiction dissolves. That is, to the extent this understanding
was common, there is no reason to think that representing state interests in a national legislature and
having a long-sighted view of the national interest beyond day-to-day politics are in conflict.
32. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 177 (quoting Georgia Delegate Pierce’s
statement during the debates); see also Madison, Debates, supra note 23, at 163.
33. Id. at 175–79.
34. The Federalist No. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion,
and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular
State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The
Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as
political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing
Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. . . .
From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed
character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL
35
features.

When combined with his earlier statement noting the democratic
nature of both bodies, the meaning of Madison’s argument becomes
clear. Giving elected state legislatures the power to appoint senators and
voters the power to select members of the House directly meant that the
two houses of Congress would provide two different types of democratic
representation: individual (as national citizens) in the House and
collective (as citizens of a State) in the Senate.
In an important article, Terry Smith challenged the argument that
state legislatures were intentionally given the power to select senators to
36
give states control over the Senate. Instead, Smith argues, it was the
result of the intersection of two other debates: the Great Compromise,
which gave small states equal representation in the Senate, and differences
37
about the value of elite versus popular representation. In fact, there was
widespread disgust with the idea that states as entities would be given
representation rather than citizens, including from Madison and
38
Alexander Hamilton. The design features of the Senate, from the ability
of senators from the same state to vote differently to the absence of the
power of states to recall senators, were inconsistent with the idea of a
Senate that represented states. According to Smith, the Founders chose to
39
have state legislatures select senators and later developed an explanation.
Smith further argues that during the battles over ratification, the
inconsistencies in the justification for state legislative election were laid
40
bare. The Federalists had to face claims by Anti-Federalists that the
Constitution was inconsistent with state sovereignty because, by the
41
understanding at the time, sovereignty was indivisible. James Wilson,
leading the campaign for the Constitution in Pennsylvania, instead argued
that sovereignty “resides in the citizens,” allowing for it to be represented

35. Id. at 244.
36. Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: the Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C.
L. Rev. 1, 21–34 (1996).
37. Id. at 19–26.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 21–22.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id. at 31.
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42

in different forms at different levels of government. Acceptance of this
argument, Smith claims, nullified any argument that the Senate was an
expression of state sovereignty. “The legislative appointment of federal
Senators was not a mechanism for representing state legislatures in the
Senate, for these entities did not in reality possess sovereign powers—
43
only the people did.”
Smith successfully undermines the notion that the Senate was
intentionally designed exclusively as a means of protecting state
sovereignty. But, as the arguments made by Madison and Wilson during
44
ratification suggest, one key proffered justification for allocating this
power to state legislatures was providing representation to the people of
each state in their capacity as state residents. There were no national
political parties when the Constitution was written, and the idea of such
45
parties was anathema to the Founders. Instead, each state had its own
political culture, local leaders, press, and social organizations. Thus,
politics internal to each state could be, and were, quite different from
politics at the national level. State legislatures represented a state’s
political culture. Allocating the power to appoint senators to state
legislatures meant that there would be two types of representation for
citizens.
As with any such decision, many forces surely played a role in the
decision to allocate power to choose senators to the state legislatures.
However, three lessons can be drawn from the history of the original
decision to give state legislatures the power to appoint U.S. senators that
may help explain the debate over the Seventeenth Amendment. First,
state legislative appointment was designed to ensure elite—and not
purely popular—representation. Second, the Framers took seriously the
benefits of using the Senate to provide representation for states in the
federal government. Third, the decisions to give the power to state
legislatures instead of the state as a whole, the absence of recall power, and
the ability of senators from the same state to vote differently meant that
senators were not seen as ambassadors of state governments. Instead,
senators were meant to provide representation to citizens in their capacity
as citizens of states, rather than just as citizens of the nation.
B. Where Did Support for Direct Elections Come from?
If the Senate was designed in part to protect state governments
against federal encroachment and in part to provide an alternative means
of representation for voters, it is a riddle why state election of senators

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 33–34.
See Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 269.
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was abandoned overwhelmingly in 1913 without any real debate over the
extent to which it would affect the role of states in the federal
government. Traditional accounts of the history of the Seventeenth
Amendment provide a number of explanations for its success, but none
of them directly address the two most difficult questions about its
passage: why direct election was so overwhelmingly popular in the state
legislatures it disempowered and why there was so little discussion of
how direct elections reduced state authority and power.
Before discussing the history of the Seventeenth Amendment, it is
important to see how the Senate functioned during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. There is some dispute about the extent to which the
Senate ever truly provided representation to citizens collectively or
protected the interests of state governments. William Riker and Larry
Kramer argue that the original set-up of the Senate strongly limited the
46
degree to which senators served as representatives of states. Once
appointed, senators were largely independent of state legislatures
because of their six-year terms and because state legislatures did not
have the power of recall. Further, although state legislatures did have the
power to “instruct” senators on specific votes, this power was restricted
by their limited power to punish wayward senators and was phased out
47
after abuse during the Jackson Administration. According to Riker, the
result was that having state legislatures select senators “did not . . . have
quite the anticipated effect. Except for a few occasions when sectionalism
has been organized by state governments, the Senate has not been a
48
peripheralizing institution.”
Todd Zywicki, on the other hand, while acknowledging the
limitations created by the lack of the power of recall and the atrophying
of the instruction power, argues:
Nonetheless, instruction and the remaining enforcement mechanisms
such as refusal to reelect and forced resignations provided state
legislatures with some measure of control over Senators. . . .
[S]tatistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the Senate played an
active role in preserving the sovereignty and independent sphere of
49
action of state governments.

Regardless of the emphasis one puts on this evidence, it is clear that
the Senate was not as robust an institution in protecting state interests as
some Framers intended. But it is also clear that it was not a purely

46. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1506–10; William H. Riker, The Senate
and American Federalism, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 455–63 (1955).
47. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 224 n.33; Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1508–09.
48. Riker, supra note 46, at 455.
49. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 173–74.
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national institution either. The question of why the original Senate was
changed remains.
Scholars usually date the beginning of the national movement in
favor of direct elections to the 1870s, when advocates introduced the first
50
real efforts to amend the Constitution in Congress. Others point to the
rise of the “public canvass,” in which candidates for Senate, starting in
the 1830s, would stump for state legislators, making state legislative
51
elections into partial proxies for the popular support for the candidates.
The most famous example of the “public canvass” was the nationally
followed Illinois Senate race of 1858, in which the state legislative election
served as a proxy for the titanic battle between Abraham Lincoln and
Stephen Douglas, with Democratic state legislative candidates pledging
52
their support to Douglas and Republicans to Lincoln. After the Civil
War, President Andrew Johnson wrote that the arguments in favor of
direct election of senators were so overwhelming that they barely needed
53
explaining.
Regardless of the exact beginning of the movement for direct
elections, it is clear that it picked up rapidly during the mid-1870s, when
members of Congress regularly began to file constitutional amendments to
54
institute direct elections for senators. Additionally, many states began
adopting primary elections for senators, in which partisans could directly
55
choose the candidate of their choice. This, of course, did not create
direct elections—whichever party won the state legislature would still
have the power to choose its candidates. However, the public profile of
Senate candidates meant that their popularity (or lack thereof) became
56
increasingly important in state legislative elections.
Around the turn of the century, state legislatures began to actively
push for a constitutional amendment. Between 1890 and 1905, thirty-one
of the forty-five state legislatures had passed resolutions either calling on
Congress to pass an amendment providing for the direct election of
senators, to hold a conference with other states to work on such an
amendment, or to have a Constitutional Convention such that the direct

50. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 103 (noting that although amendments to change the form of
senatorial appointment had been proposed in the 1820s and 1830s, the first real efforts to amend the
Constitution to require direct election occurred in the 1870s); see also Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra
note 2, at 174 (same).
51. See Riker, supra note 46, at 464.
52. See id. at 464–65.
53. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 102.
54. See Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L.J. 1971, 1976 (1994) (citing 1 George H. Haynes, The Senate of
the United States: Its History and Practice 96–97 (1938)).
55. Id. at 1977 (describing the rise of Senate party primaries and noting, where one party was
dominant, like the solid Democratic South, that these functioned like direct elections).
56. See Riker, supra note 46, at 466.
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elections could be included in a newly drawn Constitution. They were
aided by the popular press, which seized on the issue: William Randolph
Hearst hired muckraking journalist David Graham Phillips to write a
sensationalist exposé, “The Treason of the Senate,” which attacked the
58
appointed Senate as a club of corrupt millionaires.
States also began to implement direct elections themselves through
59
a clever mechanism that became known as the “Oregon system.” Under
the Oregon system, state legislative candidates were required to state on
the ballot whether they would abide by the results of a formally non60
binding direct election for U.S. senator. Almost all legislative candidates
did so, fearing popular wrath if they did not, and followed the results
61
once elected. By 1908, twenty-eight of the forty-five states used the
Oregon system or some other form of direct elections, some adopted
62
through the initiative process and others through legislative action.
In the House of Representatives, direct election of senators was
nearly as popular. Amendments to the Constitution providing for direct
63
election passed the House in each session between 1893 and 1912.
Hardliners in the Senate managed to fend off each of these efforts and
were aided when the Amendment became linked with a highly
controversial attempt by southern senators remove Congress’s ability to
64
pass voting rights legislation from the Elections Clause of Article I. But
in 1912, supporters of the Amendment severed the Amendment from the
change to the Elections Clause, and the drumbeat of popular support
65
ensured its passage. The fear of a Constitutional Convention, which
could have resulted in more dramatic changes to the Constitution, the

57. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 108–09.
58. Much later, the articles were republished in book form. See generally David Graham
Phillips, The Treason of the Senate (George E. Mowry & Judson A. Grenier eds., 1964); see also
Donald R. Matthews, 30 Pub. Opinion Q. 326, 326–27 (1966) (reviewing David Graham Phillips, The
Treason of the Senate (1906)). Phillips’s attack was so prominent that President Theodore Roosevelt
devoted a major address to rebutting it. Id.
59. Kobach, supra note 54, at 1978 (describing the Oregon system).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 178–79.
63. See generally Sara Brandes Crook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-So-Distant Mirror: The 17th
Amendment and Congressional Change, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 845 (1997); see also Rossum, supra note
27, at 705–06 n.186.
64. The original draft of what would become the Seventeenth Amendment included a change to
Article I, Section 4, the Elections Clause, that would have given states, and not the federal
government, sole control over setting the time, place, and manner of Senate elections. See Smith, supra
note 36, at 41–50. Southern Democrats, who were worried that the federal government might interfere
with the exclusion of African Americans from voting, defended this proposed change on federalism
grounds. But the Senate passed the so-called Bristow Amendment, which removed the part of the
Seventeenth Amendment that would have changed the Elections Clause, before it was sent to the
states. Id.
65. See Smith, supra note 36, at 53.
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defeat of many senators opposed to direct election, and the
overwhelming nature of popular opinion in favor of direct election led
66
the Senate to send the Amendment to the states in 1912. It took less
than eleven months for three quarters of the states to ratify the
67
Amendment, and it went into law in 1913.
One particularly notable part of the debate in Congress and popular
opinion over the Seventeenth Amendment was the absence of any
discussion about the effect that weakening state control over the Senate
might have for federalism. Ralph Rossum wrote:
The popular press, the party platforms, the state memorials, the House
and Senate debates, and the state legislative debates during ratification
focused almost exclusively on expanding democracy, eliminating
political corruption, defeating elitism, and freeing the states from what
they had come to regard as an onerous and difficult responsibility.
Almost no one (not even among the opposition) paused to weigh the
68
consequences of the Amendment on federalism.
69

There were a few exceptions. Notably, Senators Elihu Root and
George Hoar gave several impassioned speeches about the effect of the
Seventeenth Amendment on the constitutional system of federalism,
quoting extensively from The Federalist Papers and the Constitutional
70
Convention. However, proponents of the Amendment did not justify
their support on the grounds of national unity or centralization, but
71
instead focused on other issues. Root and Hoar’s federalism-based
defense did little and the Senate passed the Amendment.
This history leaves many questions: Where did the near-universal
support for direct election of senators come from? Why was there no real
opposition inside the state legislatures that the Amendment
disempowered? Why was there virtually no discussion during the long
debate over the Seventeenth Amendment of the harm it did to state
governmental authority?
There are a number of reasons scholars usually give for the passage
of the Seventeenth Amendment, most notably the rise of the Progressive
movement and problems related to the specifics of state legislative
selection, including unfilled senatorial seats and corruption in the
selection of senators. A close look shows that each explanation has force,
but none explain the aforementioned questions raised by the history of
the Seventeenth Amendment.

66. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 176.
67. See, e.g., 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Direct Election of U.S. Senators, Nat’l
Archives, http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/17th-amendment (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
68. Rossum, supra note 27, at 711–12.
69. That is, exceptions in addition to the argument over the proposed change in the Elections
Clause, which was debated largely on federalism grounds. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 544.
70. Rossum, supra note 27, at 713–14.
71. Id. at 714–15.
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The traditional story is that the rise of the Progressive and Populist
movements led to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Much of
the popular argument for the Amendment sounded in Progressive
rhetoric: opposition to corrupt state legislatures bought by seedy business
trusts and powerful party machines, dislike for corrupt “elite”
representation, and extensive faith in the ability of the people to govern
72
when impediments to their rule were removed.
But revisionist scholars have persuasively shown that this story is, at
73
very least, overly simplified. While the Progressive and Populist
proponents of direct elections were indeed prominent at the time of the
Seventeenth Amendment, the claim that the Amendment’s success can
be explained solely by their support is problematic. After all, despite
other major successes in the electoral field (such as women’s suffrage, state
constitutional amendments providing for initiatives, non-partisan elections
and council-manager systems at the local level), the Seventeenth
Amendment was the Progressives’’ only success in reforming the structure
74
of the federal government. Other proposals for structural change at the
federal level, like abolishing the Electoral College, made little or no
75
headway. Even at the state level, where Progressives were successful in
passing major election reforms, they were largely unable to rally mass
76
support for changes to the form of legislatures. For instance, numerous
Progressive proposals for unicameral legislatures in the states were
77
defeated. If nothing else, one must explain why this component of the
Progressive agenda was more successful than others.
Moreover, merely pointing to the broader success of the Progressive
movement does not explain the breadth of support for the Seventeenth
Amendment. Urban political machines, usually opponents of “goo-goo”

72. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–210 (a contemporary summary of the arguments in favor of
direct election); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 185–86 (noting that the conventional
wisdom on the Seventeenth Amendment is to credit the Progressive movement).
73. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 184–95; Bybee, supra note 2, at 538–45.
74. Thomas E. Baker, Towards a “More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts on Amending the
Constitution, 10 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 11 (2000) (noting the support of the Progressives for the
Nineteenth Amendment, which provided for female suffrage); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2,
at 194 (noting Progressive support for recall and referenda at the state level); Schleicher, City Council
Elections, supra note 19, at 465–67 (describing Progressive support for non-partisan elections and
council manager systems).
75. See Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 194–95.
76. See John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the
Progressive Era, 30 Rutgers L.J. 933, 963–64 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (“As a result, although the
various alternatives to the traditional bicameral arrangement attracted a fair amount of support in
several of the state conventions, and came within a single vote of being approved by the Nebraska
Convention, none of these proposals was ultimately adopted, at least during the Progressive era. It was
not until 1935 that Nebraska became the first and only state to enact a unicameral system, through an
initiative procedure.”).
77. Id.
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Progressives, also supported direct election. Direct elections also
attracted support from big business interests, which either had an
oppositional or ambivalent relationship with the Progressive and Populist
79
movements.
Most importantly, a story built around the rise of the Progressive
movement cannot explain the absence of state-based opposition. This
was, after all, the era of Jim Crow and states, particularly southern ones,
80
resisted other intrusions on the scope of their power. Most Southern
legislatures had passed resolutions calling on Congress to pass a
constitutional amendment providing for direct elections well before it did
81
so. State voters can achieve policy ends only by acting through state
legislatures. Groups of voters that regularly won state legislative
elections, and influential interest groups inside state legislatures, were in
a position to reject direct elections. Any persuasive theory of why the
Seventeenth Amendment passed needs to explain why voters, interest
groups, and politicians who were winning at the state level, and thus had
the power to appoint U.S. senators, decided to give this power away and
use an alternate method in which their influence would be less certain.
Although the Progressives and Populists—strong political forces in the
early twentieth century—pushed for the Seventeenth Amendment, their
influence alone cannot explain the overwhelming popular and political
support for the direct election of senators.
Explanations rooted in the specifics of the practice of the state
legislatures face similar problems. Two common arguments during the
debates over direct election were that state legislatures were corrupt in
their selection of senators and that deadlocks in state legislatures
82
resulted in unfilled senatorial seats. Deadlocks could persist because an
1866 federal law required the votes of a majority, and not merely a

78. See Richard Hofstatder, The Age of Reform 254 (1955) (“If big business was the ultimate
enemy of the Progressive, his proximate enemy was the political machine.”). See generally John D.
Buenker, The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment, 56 J. Am. Hist. 305 (1969)
(describing urban political machine support for the Seventeenth Amendment).
79. See Hofstatder, supra note 78, at 254 (noting opposition between big business and the
Progressive movement); Smith, supra note 36, at 66 n.328 (describing business support for the
Seventeenth Amendment); Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 185 (arguing that the
Progressive movement was not opposed to business interests).
80. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1009 (2003) (“Trust in state
governments enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nineteenth Century, particularly after public
opinion turned against the northern occupation of the South and the Union programs of
Reconstruction.”); Forrest McDonald, States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776–
1876, at 208–23 (2000) (“[During this period] attempts to encroach upon the powers reserved to the states
were struck down by the Supreme Court and were disapproved by the vast majority of Americans.”).
81. See Haynes, supra note 28, at 108.
82. See Bybee, supra note 2, at 539–43.
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plurality, of state legislators to elect a senator. Although these
arguments were certainly a large part of the campaign by proponents of
direct election, they do not fully explain how the Seventeenth
Amendment passed. While there was certainly some corruption in
selecting senators, politics is never free of the stench of the improper,
and there needs to be an explanation for why of all sources of corruption,
reformers targeted local election of for elimination by constitutional
84
amendment. Also, the alleged sources of that corruption—business
groups powerful at the state level and political machines—were key
supporters of direct elections. If these groups had the power to sneak
through senators over popular worry about corruption, there needs to be
an additional explanation for why they did not have enough power to
stop direct elections—and in fact did not want too. Deadlock as an
explanation is particularly odd because there were not that many seats left
85
unfilled; those empty seats resulted from a change in federal law that
could have easily been changed back without amending the Constitution.
Leading revisionist scholar Todd Zywicki uses the “tools of public
86
choice” to explain the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Zywicki
argues that the Amendment passed due to lobbying by national special
87
interest groups, ranging from business trusts to unions. These groups,
he claims, supported the Amendment for several reasons: it would
reduce the cost of lobbying for favorable legislation by national interest
groups because lobbyists would only have to engage with one body and
88
not fifty; it would increase the length of senatorial tenures, permitting
89
interest groups to form long-term relationships with senators; and it
would reduce monitoring of senators because state legislatures were
better at ensuring that senators did the bidding of the voting public

83. See Election Laws, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
contested_elections/election_laws.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (discussing the 1866 Act and the
resulting election delays).
84. Also, there are substantial questions about how much actual corruption there was. Bybee, supra
note 2, at 539 (“Between 1857 and 1900, the Senate investigated ten cases of alleged bribery or corruption,
although in only three cases was a Senate committee able to conclude that the charges had merit.”).
85. Id. at 542 (“Between 1891 and 1905, eight state legislatures failed to elect senators and were
without full representation from periods of ten months to four years.”).
86. Zywicki makes these claims over the course of two articles: Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra
note 2, and Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2. While there is much debate about
how to define public choice, the simplest and most encompassing definition was given Dennis Mueller:
“The economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the application of economics to
political science.” Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II, at 1 (1989).
87. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 216; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra
note 2, at 1039, 1054.
88. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 215–17; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests,
supra note 2, at 1032–33, 1040–41.
89. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1048–49, 1052.
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rather than special interest groups. National interest groups thus had an
91
interest in direct elections because it made the Senate easier to lobby.
These claims provide interesting arguments for why certain interest
groups might have supported the Amendment when it was proposed in
Congress. But there are reasons to be skeptical that Zywicki’s argument
can explain what is really perplexing about the history of the Amendment.
To start, it is difficult to understand why any one interest group
would expend substantial resources on a structural constitutional issue as
a lobbying strategy. Even if the Seventeenth Amendment benefited all
national interest groups, each interest should have faced a collective action
problem counseling against spending resources in favor of this type of
92
constitutional change that would benefit all national interests equally.
More pressingly, even if Zywicki is correct about the incentives of
national businesses and political interests, the increased nationalization
of politics would surely create losers as well as winners. According to
Zywicki, those who were harmed by the Seventeenth Amendment—such
as state-based businesses, rural interests who benefited from unequally
sized districts in the state legislature—should have been relatively more
powerful inside state legislatures. Their influence with state legislatures is
exactly what would have made them lose out as a result of the passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment. If Zywicki’s is correct, the last holdouts
against the Seventeenth Amendment should have been resistant state
legislatures, but the opposite is true. State legislatures and state branches
of the national political parties led the fight for direct election. There is
nothing in the historical record that reveals national interest groups
becoming newly and heavily involved in state legislative debates over the
subject.

90. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 207–09; Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests,
supra note 2. at 1041–42.
91. Zywicki also argues that Western states, who had already implemented direct elections, had
an interest in passing the Seventeenth Amendment because Eastern states had long-serving senators
and introducing popular elections might remove these senators, opening up committee and leadership
positions for Western senators. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1048.
While this may have played a role, support for direct election was national. Support in Eastern states
like Pennsylvania, Maine, and New Jersey was strong enough for their state legislatures to call for a
Constitutional Convention in order to pass an amendment in favor of the direct election of senators.
There were also calls for a convention in Midwestern states like Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin, and Southern states like North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, and
Texas. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 764–89 (1993). All Eastern states with the exception
of Rhode Island, which never voted, ratified the Seventeenth Amendment. One Western state, Utah,
voted not to ratify. All of the rest of the non-ratifying states were either Southern or border states. See
Rossum, supra note 27, at 711.
92. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 2, at 1054 (acknowledging that there is
no evidence of lobbying by particular interest groups).
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Thus, the most significant problem with the revisionist take on the
Seventeenth Amendment is one it shares with the mainstream history it
challenges. Neither can explain the absence of opposition among the
state legislatures, state-based interest groups, and successful state
political groups that it disempowered.
Although success in politics is often either over- or under-determined
and has a degree of randomness, existing explanations are just not up to
the task of explaining why the movement for direct elections succeeded.

II. Why Was There No State-Based Opposition to the
Seventeenth Amendment? National Political Parties and State
Democracy
Extant explanations of the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment
have one common feature—they look at who supported the Amendment
and why. This is only half of the story. The more interesting part is why
there was not opposition to the direct election of senators among state
officials and interest groups powerful in state legislatures who were
losing power. This Part argues that the lack of opposition can be
explained in part by changes in the political party system.
A. A Brief History of Political Parties From the Civil War to the
Seventeenth Amendment
It is necessary to go through a (too) quick history of American
political parties in order to recount this tale. By the mid-1830s until the
run-up to the Civil War, and then again after the War, American politics
93
had the rough outlines of a two-party system. Voting was largely
partisan, but non-ideological, with loyalty to state and local parties based
94
on ethnic and cultural ties. State parties dominated newspapers,
95
campaigning, and the distribution of ballots.
After the Civil War, the two-party system became far stronger. The
number of votes for independents dropped dramatically, except for one
96
last gasp in the early 1870s. Further, parties—both the two major
parties and a few minor parties, especially the emerging Populists—

93. See Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from
the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era 162–81 (1986); William Shade, Political Pluralism and
Party Development: The Creation of a Modern Party System, 1815–1852, in The Evolution of
American Party Systems 77, 103–04 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965).
94. See Pradeep Chhibber & Ken Kollman, The Formation of National Party Systems:
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States 209–
10 (2004); Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870–1980, at 47
(1982) (“Above all, politics was party politics.”).
95. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 210–11; McCormick, supra note 93, at 164–66,
172–73, 179, 201.
96. Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 166–73.
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became more national. Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman created a
figure, “party aggregation,” which measures how national a party system
is. Party aggregation is calculated by determining the difference between
the numbers of parties competitive nationally and the average number of
98
parties competitive in each district. In a fully aggregated system, every
party that was competitive in any congressional election would also be
competitive in all other congressional races. That is, if the system is fully
aggregated, there would be no state- or district-specific parties or
candidates.
Outside of two elections with small spikes in the early 1890s and in
1912 (after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment), the party
99
system was fully aggregated after 1870. Further, national political
parties won a high percentage of the vote in each congressional election
100
between 1876 and 1912, except for 1894.
The key turning point, Chhibber and Kollman note, occurred in the
101
1870s. For most of the nineteenth century, the national parties were in
102
many ways coalitions. Rather than having one name and organizational
structure, the national parties were composed of groups from each state
that did not run candidates against one another but were formally and
103
organizationally separate. After the 1870s, the parties unified and
“stamped out the proliferation of labels and both coalesced under singular
104
labels.” Party was also increasingly the key determinant of legislative
behavior in Congress. Party line voting increased substantially between
105
1876 and 1894.
Why the parties began to nationalize is a difficult question. Based on
comparative research in the United States, India, Canada, and Britain,
Chhibber and Kollman argue that parties nationalize following the
106
centralization of political power. That is, as power moves from states or
provinces to the federal government, party structure follows. “As policymaking authority migrates towards higher levels of government, voters
will be more inclined to choose candidates who adopt party labels at
107
broader levels of aggregations.” However, after a great deal of
97. Id. at 210.
98. They ran the same test against the number of competitive parties at the state level and the
data shows an identical narrowing. Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 169.
99. “[P]arty aggregation in the United States has been relatively successful since the 1870s. It blips
upward several times during the 1890s and the 1910s, but is quite low otherwise.” Id. at 173, 166–69.
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id. at 211.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 208–16.
104. Id. at 215.
105. Paul Kleppner, Partisanship and Ethnoreligous Conflict: The Third Electoral System, 1853–
1892, in The Evolution of American Party Systems 114, 139 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965).
106. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 21.
107. Id.
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centralizing during the Civil War, the period in question here—roughly
the 1870s to 1913—centralizing and decentralizing forces were both in
108
109
play. Chhibber and Kollman describe this as an “ambiguous” period.
However, the parties continued the trend toward national aggregation
110
throughout the period.
Although it is difficult to explain why parties aggregated as much as
they did during this period, it is easy to see a temporal connection between
this aggregation and the movement for the direct election of senators.
Despite furious battles about state rights in other policy areas, this is
111
when the campaign for the Seventeenth Amendment took off. Through
the late 1870s and 1880s, groups agitated for direct election, proposing
constitutional amendments, and pushing for party primaries and direct
112
election substitutes on the state level. However, as the movement built,
113
a major political event happened: the realignment of 1896.
Although party organizations began to nationalize, state branches of
114
parties retained differentiated local flavors through the 1870s and 1880s.
Voter turnout during this period was extremely high—the highest in
American history—and strong ethno-cultural-religious links between
groups and parties made politics fierce, competitive, and stable, with voters
115
consistently supporting the same party election to election. “[L]ate
nineteenth century parties [were] strongholds of localist resistance to
116
political centralization.” National parties were unable to provide
support for (or against) cross-sectional and cross-societal national policy
programs because their bases of political support differed from state to
state. That is, the national parties were not ideologically defined.
Democrats from New York shared little in common with Democrats
from Ohio or South Carolina. Thus, despite becoming national in scope,
the parties remained coalitions of distinct state-based institutions.
This changed in the 1890s. Political scientists have debated endlessly
how to define the term “realignment” and whether the major change in
the American political system happened in 1894 as a result of the Panic
of 1893 or in 1896 as a result of the Presidential campaign between
117
Republican William McKinley and Democrat William Jennings Bryan.

108. See id. at 156.
109. Id. at 156–60.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
112. Id.
113. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
114. Kleppner, Partisanship and Ethnoreligous Conflict, supra note 105, at 140.
115. Id. at 124.
116. Id. at 140.
117. William Schneider describes the timing and existence of realignments as “The Eternal
Question.” See William Schneider, Realignment: The Eternal Question, 15 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 449
(1982). All discussion of realigning elections begins with V.O. Key’s work. See V.O. Key, A Theory of
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Regardless, at some point in the mid-1890s, American politics changed
dramatically. Republicans gained an advantage they would hold until
118
1912. Importantly, party support became heavily regional. Republicans
dominated the populous Northeast, industrial Midwest, and most of the
West Coast, while Democrats controlled the South and competed
119
strongly in the interior West. Third parties nearly died out as effective
national forces. The Senate had twelve third-party members in the late
120
1890s but did not have a single one after 1903. Few third-party
121
members were elected to the House either.
After 1896, Congress became highly professionalized, with each
party having a strong whip organization to line up votes and control
committee assignment, resulting in a high degree of cohesiveness in party
122
voting, at least until the very end of this period. This high degree of
cohesiveness was driven by ideology: the parties became far more
programmatically coherent. “[T]he 1896 realignment . . . was the result of
123
cross-cutting issues that polarized the parties.” Debate inside parties
was also largely national and regional, not state-specific, with each
party’s Progressive movement challenging party regulars across the
124
country. After 1896, the parties were more ideologically consistent.
At the same time, politics became less based on popular rallies and
125
organization, and became more media driven. This is easiest to see in
the famous difference between William McKinley victoriously
campaigning from his back porch, a model of the new style of parties,
126
and William Jennings Bryan attending old-time religion mass rallies.
The parties’ responses to the Depression of 1893—free silver for the

Critical Elections, 17 J. Pol. 1, 18 (1955). For a debate over the date of the beginning of the
realignment of 1896, compare Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of
American Politics 38 (1970), with James Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and
Realignment of Political Parties in the United States 156 (1983).
118. Walter Dean Burnham, The System of 1896, in The Evolution of American Party Systems
147, 171–83 (Paul Kleppner et al. eds., 1965).
119. Joel Budgor et al., The 1896 Elections and Congressional Modernization: An Appraisal of the
Evidence, 5 Soc. Sci. Hist. 53, 54 (1981); Burnham, The System of 1896, supra note 118, at 171–75.
120. Id.
121. Party
Division
in
the
Senate,
1789
to
Today,
U.S.
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2014); Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 166.
122. See David Brady et al., Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate,
1880–1920, 14 Legis. Stud. Q. 205, 206 (1989).
123. David Brady & Joseph Stewart, Congressional Party Realignment and Transformations of
Public Policy, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 333, 352 (1982).
124. Howard L. Reiter, The Bases of Progressivism Within the Major Parties: Evidence from the
National Conventions, 22 Soc. Sci. Hist. 83, 86 (1998).
125. Id.
126. Presidential Elections 1896–1996: 1896: William McKinley v. William Jennings Bryan, N.Y.
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/elections/1896/index.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014).
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Bryanite Democrats, tariffs and support for industry for Republicans—
led not only to massive regionalization, but also to reorganization of
127
politics in the states. The ethno-cultural-religious links between groups
128
and parties in the pre-1896 era fell away. Turnout, which reached its
apex right before the realignment, collapsed as a result of the decline in
competitiveness in many states and the breakdown of the ethno-cultural
129
links between groups and parties. Reforms, such as the introduction of
primary elections and the secret “Australian” ballot, reduced the import
130
of state party organizations. The political parties of the turn of the
century were substantially less programmatic and centralized than
today’s parties, but they were far more programmatic and centralized
than they had been prior to 1896.
B. Why the Nationalization of Political Parties Mattered: Voter
Behavior and Political Parties
The timing of the nationalization of political parties lined up almost
exactly with the movement for direct elections. As the parties began to
centralize their operations and develop ideological programs, the states
began their push for direct elections. This Subpart argues that there are
strong theoretical reasons to think that the centralization and newly
found ideological character of national parties depressed opposition to
direct elections in state legislatures. This Subpart shows that, all else
equal, stronger national parties should mean that national politics plays a
bigger role in state elections, leaving state officials and state-centric
interest groups with less control over their political destinies. To the
extent that groups dominant in state legislatures felt that the role of
national elections increased the risk that they might lose, they should
have been more likely to support changes that would have separated
state and national politics.
Parties play a particular role in the life of a democracy. Voters have
little information about individual candidates and little reason to learn

127. See Kleppner, Who Voted?, supra note 94, at 73–82.
128. Id. at 55 (“The realignment of 1894–96 altered the political conditions that had driven latenineteenth-century electoral participation. It reduced partisan competition in most areas of the
country. In the nation’s urban-industrial Metropole, it displaced the earlier congruence between social
cleavages and party oppositions. The coalitional agreements created by the ‘System of 1896’ eroded
the older linkages among group subcultures, partisan identification, and turnout rates, without
replacing them with any news bases for social-group reinforcement. . . . The result was a participating
electorate that was considerably shrunken in size from its late-nineteenth-century level, and one that
more nearly approximated our own in its internal patterns of stratification by age cohorts and
economic status.”).
129. Id. at 33.
130. Id. at 58–59.
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131

such information. Political party labels provide the information voters
need in order for elections to serve their intended purpose of ensuring
representation and accountability.
132
Party labels help voters in a number of ways. To the extent that
party labels accurately describe the ideological commitments of candidates
running under their banner, voters only have to learn the meaning of the
party label rather than the positions and histories of the numerous
133
individual candidates on the ballot. To the extent that the incumbent
represents one party, voters do not need to rely on what politicians say,
but rather can review how government has performed. If parties are
ideologically consistent over time, voters can use their observations to
134
develop “running tallies” (in Morris Fiorina’s famous turn of phrase),
allowing them to recall policies and practices they noticed and liked
about each party and use their observations to inform their vote. These
“running tallies” allow voters to vote roughly as if they were informed
135
even if they do not know much about the candidates or relevant issues.
Further, the party label appears on the ballot, unlike interest group
endorsements, meaning that it is easy (or easier) to link observations
about the world to the actual voting decision. And because aggregate
performance is a better indicator of future behavior than individual
performance, the overall electorate can behave rationally and responsively
on what political scientists call a “macropartisan” level even if many or
136
most voters are ignorant of basic political facts.
131. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 371–72 (discussing work by Anthony Downs
and Joseph Schumpeter on why there is no instrumental reason to become informed about politics and
summarizing research on actual voter knowledge); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What
Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters 75–93 (1996) (summarizing data on voter
knowledge). To be fair, the information about voters’ political knowledge is based on survey data that
does not cover the period in question, but given the consistently weak individual incentives to become
truly informed, there is little reason to believe voters in the 1880s were different in this respect from
voters today.
132. The following paragraphs are a very short version of the lengthy literature review in
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 370–85 (summarizing research).
133. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 112–15 (1960) (showing how
party labels can allow voting even under low information).
134. Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections 89–106 (1981).
135. Id.
136. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 378 (“Finally, much revisionist work has
centered on the aggregate competence of the electorate. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro pointed
out that bits of information that register with a few voters will nonetheless move mass opinion so long
as unobservant voters stay constant in their views, or shift their views in some random, uncorrelated
fashion. Moreover, the famed Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that a mass of individuals each of whom
has only a slightly better than fifty-fifty chance of getting the right answer to a question will
collectively get the answer right almost one hundred percent of the time, so long as the individuals act
independently of one another. This has become known as the miracle of aggregation: acting together,
even barely informed individuals can function as a well-informed collective.”). See generally Robert S.
Erikson et al., The Macro Polity (2002) (finding that voters allocate responsibility to parties in ways
that are rational in aggregate, which they call “macropartisanship”).
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The capacity of the electorate to develop running tallies about
political parties affects the behavior of individuals in office. If the parties
are competitive, then they have incentives to cater to the preferences of
137
the median voter. And if they are long-lived, parties have incentives to
138
perform well in order not to sully their reputation. Well-functioning
parties, thus, help even a largely uninformed electorate to use elections
for their intended purpose: producing responsive and accountable
139
government.
One need not overstate this case. Many voters have relationships
with political parties that are more social or affective than ideological.
Membership in a party can be handed down from parents to children or
across social groups, preceding preferences about governance and
140
serving as a “perceptual screen” for thinking about politics. That is,
many become Democrats or Republicans and then adopt policy views to
141
fit the preferences of co-partisans. Even policy-minded voters are
frequently myopic, caring too much about events that occur right before
an election. Voters also have trouble assigning functional responsibility
to office holders and frequently take into account facts about the world,
from shark attacks to college football results, which are clearly outside
142
the control of the people on the ballot. But virtually everyone who
studies elections agrees that party labels are important tools—and almost

137. See Downs, supra note 133, at 105–12.
138. See John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in
America 49–50 (1995).
139. That competition provides an incentive for officials to cater to the median voter does not
necessarily mean that the results will necessarily equal the preferences of the median voter. For instance,
an influential—and quite convincing—line in modern scholarship on political parties suggests that party
policy is driven by “intense policy demanders” inside parties, largely activists and interest groups. In these
models, inter-party competition and interest in the long-term value of the party brand act as a constraint
on the policies these intense demanders can influence party officials to adopt, rather than an independent
incentive for incumbents seeking re-election and office seekers to cater to median-voter preferences as it
appears in Downs. See generally Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy
Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 Persp. on Pol. 571 (2012).
140. This theory was famously developed in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter 120–
41 (1960).
141. More accurately, almost all voters do this to some extent, but vary in how affective and how
rational their party identification is. See Elemendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 402.
142. Id. at 378–81; Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The
Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/thinking.pdf (explaining biased perceptions and presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association); Larry M. Bartels & Christopher Achen,
Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks (Vanderbilt Univ., Working
Paper No. 5-2013, 2009), available at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/larrybartels/files/ 2011/12/CSDI_WP_052013.pdf (discussing how irrelevant facts influence elections and presented at the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions); Andrew J. Healy, Neil Malhotra & Cecilia H. Mo, Personal Emotions and
Political Decision Making: Implications for Voter Competence (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research,
Paper No. 2034, 2009), available at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/detail1.asp?Document
_ID=3269 (discussing the influence of sporting results on elections).
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certainly the most important tools—uninformed voters have to ensure
143
that elections promote responsive and accountable governance.
However, the value of a party label is better thought of as a variable
than a constant. Party labels are less and more descriptive of candidates’
144
beliefs at different times. Further, party labels that are accurate at one
level can be barely descriptive at other levels. Seeing that a candidate for
the House of Representatives is a Democrat or Republican in today’s
heavily polarized Congress will tell the voter almost everything she needs
145
to know about the candidate’s future voting record. In contrast, finding
out whether a candidate for city council in most big cities is a Democrat
or Republican will tell you very little; local parties rarely take consistent
146
stands on local issues.
However, the quality of the information
expressed by the party label does not determine the likelihood of that
information being used, even by rational voters. For instance, voters in
local elections rely on party labels heavily, even though they are weakly
descriptive on a candidate’s stances, because most voters have little
147
knowledge about the policies and performance of city council members.
Democrats dominate national elections in big cities, which translates
directly into dominating local legislatures, even though preferences on
148
national and local issues are only weakly correlated.
European political scientists have given a name to this type of
149
election—“second-order elections.” When an election at one level of
government turns on voter preferences on performance and policies at
another level, it is second order. The classic example of this is elections
for the European Parliament. These elections choose officials who make
European Union policy, but their results turn entirely on the popularity
150
of Prime Ministers in each European country. As discussed more in
Part III, second-order elections can be a result of election laws that
promote “mismatch,” or the use on local or supranational ballots of party

143. See Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19, at 143–44 (reviewing literature).
144. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 384.
145. Id. at 405, 421.
146. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 440–47; Cheryl Boudreau et al., Lost in
Space?: How Endorsements Affect Spatial Voting in Low-Information Elections (Univ. Cal. Davis
Research, Paper No. 328, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232371
(presented at the 2012 Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See generally Karl H. Reif & Hermann Schmitt, Nine Second-Order National Elections: A
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results, 8 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 3 (1980).
150. See id.; Simon Hix, What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It 80–84
(2008) (discussing European Parliament elections as second-order elections); Schleicher, What if
Europe, supra note 19, at 119–30 (same).
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labels defined at the national level, and inhibit the development of
151
differentiated brands for each level of government.
We see this phenomenon in elections for offices like European
Parliament or City Council, where there is no formal link between the
activities of officials at each level. But formal ties between levels of
government—like giving state legislatures the power to appoint
senators—should increase the likelihood that elections at the lower level
of government will be second order. If you know a vote for one party’s
candidate for state legislature will have a desired effect on national
politics, but do not know its effect on state politics, basing your vote
entirely on national issues is perfectly rational.
The changes in political parties that started in the late 1870s and
took off after 1896 affected the meaning and utility of party labels. The
party labels increasingly described national political coalitions and
152
differences in ideology about what the national government should do.
As the party labels became more accurate in describing how senators
would vote on national issues, it increasingly became more reasonable
for voters to use this label to determine their voting patterns in state
legislative elections if they wanted to achieve national level policy
changes, or to hold national parties accountable for their performance.
That is, clearer party labels made it increasingly possible for state voters
to use state legislative elections to influence national politics. The change
in the meaning of party labels, thus, should have a direct relation to the
degree to which preferences about national issues—such as tariffs, the
Spanish-American War, and antitrust—determined voting patterns in
153
state legislative elections.
State elections, particularly in an era of “dual federalism” like the
period during the run-up to the Seventeenth Amendment, theoretically
should have turned on different issues than national elections, as the
154
functional responsibilities of each were quite different. Further, state
elections should serve as referenda on the performance of state officials
and state government. But if the information made available to generally
uninformed voters through party labels increasingly tracks national
politics and not the stances and performance of state politicians on state

151. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 394–408; Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19,
at 119–30; Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 453–57.
152. See supra notes 116–127 and accompanying text.
153. This is perhaps better seen as a discussion of the utility of party labels on accountability rather
than representation. As parties described national coalitions more accurately before the Seventeenth
Amendment, it became more reasonable for voters to use state legislative elections to hold the party
in power at the national level accountable for its performance in office because world events—such as
the tariff rate or unemployment rate—were more easily attributed to all officials of that party.
154. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1950) (describing
the existence and fall of dual federalism).

I - Schleicher_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete)

May 2014]

SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT & FEDERALISM

5/26/2014 10:46 AM

1071

issues, and state officials choose national officers, state elections should
track national results.
This is even true for voters who care more about state issues than
national ones. It is a relatively safe assumption that turn-of-the-lastcentury voters were without much information about individual
candidates for state legislature and that party labels provided them with
their most (and probably only) useful tool for figuring out how to vote in
state legislative elections on ideological grounds. Unless state parties
create state-specific brands in voters’ minds, state-motivated voters will
use their national preferences in state elections if that information is
155
conveyed by the party labels. The reason is that there is likely some
correlation between national and state political preferences. In the
absence of other information, it makes sense to rely on even weak
156
heuristics. As party labels increasingly described national political
commitments rather than state-based ethno-religious coalitions, the
degree to which national issues determined the votes of state-minded
voters likely increased, as these voters relied on party labels in the
absence of any other means of determining their vote in state elections.
The theory that changes in party organization and meaning had a
causal effect on the degree to which state legislative voting tracked state
issues and assessments of the performance of state officials rather than
national ones is not the only theory consistent with the facts. Another
possibility is that changes in party structure were epiphenomenal and the
real cause of changes in party and state legislative voting patterns was the
increased nationalization of the government and/or the economy. One
could argue that, as the government and economy became more national,
there was greater incentive among legislators to form ideologically
coherent parties and state voters had greater reason to use state legislative
elections to determine Senate races rather than state policy. This cannot be
ruled out, although it is worth noting that throughout the period there was
also a strong push for decentralization and leaving power in the hands of
157
states.
Most likely, the party structure reflected the increasing
nationalization of preferences and served as an independent force in
making state elections turn on national issues because of its role in
providing information to voters. But for the purposes of this Article,
whether the nationalization of the parties is a result of the nationalization
of preferences or a cause is not particularly important. What is important is
that whatever happened, the change seems to have made state issues
relatively less important in state legislative elections.

155. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 398–400.
156. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 449.
157. See Chhibber & Kollman, supra note 94, at 156.
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This theory—that there should be a causal relationship between the
form taken by political parties and the role of national politics in state
elections—can help answer the key question about the history of the
Seventeenth Amendment, namely why it was popular among the state
legislatures it disempowered. The nationalization of the meanings of
party labels meant that state legislative elections were influenced to a
greater degree by trends in preference for national parties. As state
legislative elections turned more on the performance of national officials,
state legislators, state parties, and state-based interest groups lost control
over their own fate.
State legislators might have reasonably felt that they wanted more
agency over their own fates and thought that having separate elections
for senator and state legislator would allow voters to segment national
politics from their minds when voting in state elections. Perhaps more
importantly, state-based interests—from state parties to rural groups to
local businesses—may have wanted to be able to influence election
results at the state level without worrying that their efforts would be
foiled by changes in far-off Washington (or beyond, if elections turned
on foreign affairs). Groups that would otherwise have been assured of
victory, due to popular support or financial muscle, could face unexpected
losses if the election turned on national events. Those powerful in each
state thus had an incentive to fight against linkages between state and
national politics. And state legislators, responsive to those powerful at
the state level, were likely responsive to this desire among state interest
groups to divorce state and national politics as a constitutional manner.
Additionally, the change in party structure weakened the affirmative
case for state legislative appointment. Recall that in the founding period,
one of the justifications for giving state legislatures the power to appoint
senators was to give the political culture of each state direct representation
158
in Congress. This type of collective representation was seen as a
complement to the “individual” representation provided in the House of
Representatives. But once voting at the Senate level became mostly
based on the national coalition to which the senator belonged, or even
the branch of the party to which the senator belonged, senators acted less
as representatives of the state or its political culture and more like
ordinary legislators, organized into coalitions based on national and
regional issues.
This explains why there was little discussion of how the Seventeenth
Amendment would harm the functioning of American federalism. The
reason few made this argument may have been that few believed that
senators still represented state governments or their unique political

158. See supra notes 28–44 and accompanying text.
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159

cultures. As the parties nationalized and centralized, the logic of having
state legislatures appoint senators withered.
Finally, the worry that Senate elections were excessively influencing
state legislative elections helps explain why contemporaneous efforts to
pass a constitutional amendment to reform the Electoral College failed
160
while the Seventeenth Amendment was successful. Although state
legislatures have the power to determine how electors are selected under
161
the original Constitution, nothing requires them to select electors
themselves. Thus, states are able to pass laws that bind electors to the
162
results of general elections. Compare this with the Oregon system,
which had no formal power to bind state legislatures because the
Constitution specifically placed the power to appoint senators in the
hands of legislatures. Thus, although they are similar in many respects,
nothing short of a constitutional amendment could remove senatorial
politics from state legislative politics, whereas laws setting up a system of
effectively direct elections for electoral college votes did not require a
constitutional amendment.
This is just a theoretical treatment of why there might have been a
causal relationship between the rise of national parties and the decline in
opposition to direct elections in state legislatures. Doing much more than
159. This also explains why there is so little in the record about how the Seventeenth Amendment
would help or hurt the Democrats or Republicans. While it is amazing to imagine this from a modern
perspective, people at the time probably imagined that the effect on the parties would be negligible, as
state legislative elections were already tracking support for U.S. senators.
160. There is a limit to the degree to which the nationalization of party labels can capture the full
range of reasons for the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. The argument here is that the reason
voters wanted a constitutional amendment (as opposed to simply adopting the Oregon system) was that
they wanted to limit state legislative discretion in their own state to reduce the influence of national
politics on state elections. But surely, part of the reason to use the constitutional amendment process was
also to influence how other states chose their senators. And this story does not explain that.
161. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (upholding a state legislative plan to establish
districted popular votes for the Electoral College). Notably, in states where the state legislature chose
the electors directly, state legislative elections quickly became second order, with interest in the vote
for President dominating any state-specific concerns. For instance, the most crucial state in the
presidential election of 1800, between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, was New York, where the
state legislature chose the electors. Edward J. Larson, A Magnificent Catastrophe: The
Tumultuous Election of 1800, America’s First Presidential Campaign 87–106 (2007). When New
York City voted for state legislature (which would determine control over the state legislature), both
the Federalists and Republicans campaigned heavily. Id. This state legislative election was treated as a
national referendum: “The local press focused squarely on national issues, not state ones. The looming
showdown between Jefferson and Adams subverted the local race to national ends and relegated the
Assembly candidates to the role of willing surrogates for the presidential aspirants.” Id. at 93.
Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who led the Federalist campaign in New York, was engaged in a
secret game to push the incumbent Adams aside as the Federalist candidate for President by
promoting “individuals loyal to him for the New York legislature rather than secur[ing] the strongest
Federalist candidates, some of whom might favor Adams.” Id. at 95–96. Thus, not only did national
politics dominate state elections for voters that knew the state legislature would choose the President,
but national politics even dominated the method of choosing candidates.
162. See generally Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (holding that faithless elector laws are constitutional).
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this is difficult, as the argument is attempting to provide an explanation for
an absence—namely, why did we not see opposition to the Seventeenth
Amendment among state legislatures. But evidence from debates over the
Seventeenth Amendment suggests that such a relationship existed.
C. Debates over the Seventeenth Amendment
[N]ational interests, the party interests, are so overwhelming

163

—Sen. John Palmer

The long public debate over the Seventeenth Amendment, both in
Congress and in the popular press, focused on two contentions made by
supporters of direct election: that (1) state legislatures were corrupt and
easily bought by powerful business interests, and (2) state legislative
164
appointment was elitist and anti-democratic. There was also debate
about the effect of choosing senators on the state legislative calendar,
with many officials arguing that deadlocks and debate over senatorial
appointments left state legislatures with little time to do the business of
165
state government.
Scholars investigating these arguments, however, have dismissed
deadlocks and state legislative delay as causes for the passage of
166
Seventeenth Amendment. William Riker, perhaps the leading scholar
on the subject, notes that Progressives at the turn of the last century
considered direct elections to be a move in favor of federalism, but
dismisses this argument as faintly ridiculous:
It was . . . frequently asserted that the direct election of senators would
peripheralize federalism, strengthening state legislatures by forcing
them to concentrate on state business. It is difficult to understand how
even the progressive propagandists imagined that depriving legislatures
of their only control over national affairs would strengthen houses that
167
were already decadent for want of a significant agenda.

Riker fails to notice that the effect of senatorial appointment was
not only on state legislative time, but also on state legislative elections.
Although much debate over the Seventeenth Amendment focused on
the value of elite representation and claims that it would enhance
democracy, there was, in fact, substantial discussion of the effect of
senatorial appointment on state legislative elections. Supporters thought
that holding direct elections for senators would strengthen state
democracy, not only because doing so would reduce the time state
legislatures devoted to senatorial appointment, but also because it would

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

28 Cong. Rec. 6160–61 (1896) (statement of Sen. John Palmer).
See Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–77, 195–96.
Id. at 191–95.
See, e.g., Riker, supra note 46, at 468; Zywicki, Beyond the Shell, supra note 2, at 195–200.
See Riker, supra note 46, at 468.
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allow voters in state legislative elections to focus on state issues rather
than national ones.
The evidence for this comes from popular histories of the
Seventeenth Amendment and debates on the floor of Congress. While
there little information about the debates in state legislatures, this
evidence—much of which references such debates—is at least strongly
suggestive that, at the time, state legislatures were concerned with the
degree to which state elections turned on state issues during an era of
national political parties.
1. Debates in Congress
There is substantial evidence that the effect of senatorial appointment
on state legislative elections was a key concern in the debate in Congress
over the Seventeenth Amendment. Supporters of the Seventeenth
Amendment argued over many years that national party politics and
national issues intruded on state legislative elections because state
legislators had the power to appoint senators. Direct election of senators
was necessary to make state democracy function. Further, national party
centralization had already ensured that senators were national political
figures and not representatives of states, such that the case for legislative
appointment was unavailing.
Senator John Hipple Mitchell ran the Oregon Republican Party
machine for many years, and as a result, his opinions were likely
168
representative of Republican opinion in the state legislature. Mitchell
was also one of the leading advocates of direct election, leading the floor
169
fight in the Senate. Both on the floor of the Senate and in accompanying
editorial writing, Mitchell made clear that the influence of national politics
on state elections was a major reason for his support. Writing in the
popular journal The Forum, Mitchell argued:
Another vital objection to the choosing of Senators by the legislatures
. . . is found in the fact that in the selection of candidates for the
legislature whose business it is to choose a Senator, every consideration
is lost sight of except as to how the candidates, if elected, will vote on
the question of senatorship. This becomes the vital issue in all such
campaigns, while the question as to the candidate’s qualifications or
fitness for the business of general legislation, or as to the views he
entertains upon the great subjects of material interest to the State—
taxation, assessments, schools, internal improvements, revenue,

168. See Richard Clucas, The Oregon Constitution and the Quest for Party Reform, 87 Or. L. Rev.
1061, 1069–70 (2009). Senator Mitchell’s name should ring a bell for those who study civil procedure,
as he played a central role in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Mitchell was an, er, colorful
character, as Wendy Purdue’s wonderful history of Pennoyer v. Neff makes clear. Wendy Collins
Purdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered,
62 Wash. L. Rev. 479, 482–95 (1987).
169. Haynes, supra note 28, at 103.
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corporations, appropriations, salaries and fees of officers, trusts,
municipal affairs, civil and criminal code, apportionment and other like
important subjects—is wholly ignored, and thus not unfrequently, the
most vital interests of the State are made to suffer from the very fact
that the question of the selection of a Senator is a distracting and
disturbing element, not only in the legislature itself, but in the primary
and other elections involving the selection of members of the
170
legislature.

Mitchell—one of the leaders in the floor debate in the Senate in favor
of the Seventeenth Amendment—put as one of his central arguments in
favor of direct elections that it would improve state democracy. He
171
repeated this argument on the floor of the Senate. Thus, prior to the
establishment of the Oregon system of quasi-direct elections, the leader
of the Oregon Republican Party grounded his argument for direct
election in part on the costs appointment of senators had on the
accountability of the state legislature.
Mitchell was not the only senator to raise this argument. Senator
John McCauley Palmer of Illinois argued that having state legislatures
appoint senators was less democratic than having the Electoral College
choose the President because the Electoral College had no other task,
172
while state legislatures had to govern states. Giving state legislatures
the power to appoint senators meant that the only thing that mattered in
state legislative elections was voter preferences about national parties:
It is simply a question whether the legislature, which is charged with
the duty of conserving the interests of the State, shall be also required
to separate themselves from those great duties and continue the
exercise of the power of choosing Senators. That the duties interfere
with each other nobody can doubt, because if there were no political
influences—I mean if the legislatures of the States were disconnected
entirely from the election of Senators—they would be the
representatives of the real and present interests of the people of the
States. Now, whatever may be the wants or the necessities of the
people of the States with respect to local legislation, the legislators are
elected with reference to the vote they will cast for Senator, and thus
these duties are made to conflict, and the national interests, the party
interests, are so overwhelming in comparison with those of the people
of the States, of the local interests, that a Democratic legislature, or a
Republican legislature, or a Populist legislature, instead of consulting
the interests for which they are elected assume at once the sphere and
field of political action, and if they elect a Senator who is satisfactory to
the party in power all their shortcomings in regard to the interests of
the people of their States are forgiven, unless indeed they should be
guilty of some crime which would subject them to indictment. It is a

170. Sen. John H. Mitchell, Election of Senators by a Popular Vote, in The Forum 25, 394 (June 6,
1896), available at http://www.unz.org/Pub/Forum-1896jun-00385.
171. 28 Cong. Rec. 6152 (1896) (statement of Sen. John H. Mitchell).
172. 28 Cong. Rec. 6160–61 (1896) (statement of Sen. John Palmer).
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mixture of authority and a confusion of duties from which the
173
legislatures of the States ought to be relieved.

Palmer was clear that voter preferences about national parties
dominated state legislative elections, which was why he supported direct
election. Thus, another leading voice in the Senate on the subject thought
that the combination of national parties and senatorial appointment led
voters to ignore state issues when voting for state legislators.
In debates in the House, Representative Henry Tucker III of
Virginia—later dean of the law schools at Washington and Lee and
George Washington Universities and President of the American Bar
174
Association —made similar claims. In 1892, he argued that “the power
given to the Legislature of the State to legislate on local matters for the
interests of the people should not be interfered with or diverted by
electoral functions in Federal matters forced upon it under the
175
Constitution.” He then went on to explain exactly why senatorial
appointment interfered with state democracy:
[A] state may be greatly interested in a matter of local opinion. The
political parties of the State may be divided on the subject, and yet the
people of the State . . . may be in favor of such a law. But as there is a
United States Senator to be elected in the Legislature, which is to be
chosen at the same time that the local option bill is sought to be passed,
the men that are in favor of the bill split their votes between the
Democratic, the Republican and possibly the third party people. Why?
In order to elect a United States Senator, when the matter they regard
as of vital importance at their door is suffered to go down because of
the injection of the Federal matter into the election of local State
officers. . . . I would divorce as far as possible the Federal power from
the State, and I would take away the power which is given under the
present system which may defeat the local demands of the people
because of the electoral functions in federal matters conferred upon
the State legislatures by this provision of the Constitution for the
176
betterment of neither and to the injury of both.

Notice that Tucker’s argument relies heavily on the idea that party
organizations—the Democratic, Republican, or “third party people”—do
not divide on state issues but rather on national ones. Representative
John Small, a Democrat from North Carolina, made a similar claim,
arguing that changes in the party system were central to understanding
senatorial appointment:
Another question which now plays a very prominent part in the choice
of United States Senators was not thought of when the Constitution
was adopted. The present party system of the United States was not

173. Id.(emphasis added).
174. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Henry St. George Tucker, U.S. Congress,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000399 (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
175. 23 Cong. Rec. 6065 (1892) (statement of Rep. Henry Tucker).
176. Id.
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known, and no prophet had arisen who could fortell what the future
party organization would be. All who favored the election of Senators
by the legislatures did so in order to remove those elections from all
partisanship and to keep them absolutely free from the influence of the
Federal Government. When the matter was debated in the early days
of our country’s history the objection was always made that to have the
election of Senators placed in the hands of the people would be to
177
invite corruption and Federal influence.

Small then claimed that senators were chosen because of the
influence of the federal government—and particularly the President—
and that they were more responsive to federal party influence than state
interests. This was contrary, he claimed, to the intended separation of
powers in the Constitution:
Another fact of common notoriety which can be proved is that the
election of Senators is not now ever free from Federal influences when
the legislature of the State which elects the Senator is controlled by the
same party which controls the Federal Administration.
....
The question of what they are elected for goes to the very
fundamental principle of the existence of the Senate. If they are
elected by Federal influences, they can not serve the State as the
Constitution intended they should. Experience has shown that the
present method brings about elections by means of Federal
influences. . . .
. . . [T]he United States Senate is not controlled by the States; but
when the party whip is cracked with orders from the Executive
178
Mansion, the Senators obey the whip and fall into line.

Small was clear that changes in the party system had weakened the
Founders’ desire for the Senate to provide an alternative form of
democratic representation from the House and the Presidency.
These are only characteristic of the debates of the period. These
comments suggest that members of Congress thought that changes in the
party system were linked both to (1) increasing the cost of senatorial
appointment by making state legislative elections turn on national issues,
and (2) reducing the benefits of senatorial appointment because
appointed senators had become more responsive to national alliances
than state-specific concerns. The next Subpart addresses how scholars at
the time thought that the effect of direct elections on state legislatures
was central to the case for the Seventeenth Amendment.
2. Scholarship, the Press, and the Case for Direct Election
In 1906, Political scientist George Henry Haynes published a
detailed history of senatorial appointment, including a summary of all

177. 33 Cong Rec. Appx. 315 (1900) (statement of Rep. John Small).
178. Id. at 316–17.
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179

arguments for and against direct election. Senator Robert Byrd noted
180
that it is “an invaluable resource that has yet to be equalled.” This is
the most comprehensive existing work on the movement in favor of
direct election, and provides the most compelling evidence of the
importance of preserving state democracy as an explanation for support
for the Seventeenth Amendment.
Haynes lists a large number of arguments in favor of direct election
and lines up the usual suspects, ranging from the effect of direct election
on increasing democracy to improving the quality of the Senate by limiting
the chances of senators being elected only because of their proficiency in
181
“the arts of the ward politician.” He discusses corruption, the likely
effect on the wealthy becoming senators, and many other issues.
But Haynes also devotes a whole chapter to how the “popular
election of Senators would be of advantage to the state and local
182
governments.” Haynes summarizes several arguments, but the first and
central one is that, although state governments have a great deal of
power, “the spell which the national party casts upon the average voter is
so strong that he rarely recognizes that, under all ordinary circumstances,
it is the near-at-hand state government that his life, his liberty and his
183
pursuit of happiness are far more essentially affected.” Haynes argues
that the reason for this is clear: “[S]tate politics has been entirely
submerged by national politics is due, probably, more than to anything
184
else, to the linking together of the two in the election of Senators.”
Haynes acknowledges that even if direct election were enacted,
candidates for the legislature would likely still run under national party
banners, but they would “go before the people to be judged upon their
merits as State legislators, not as counters in the game of federal
185
lawmaking or office-winning.” Under the appointment system, voters
face “a most embarrassing dilemma” of having to decide whether to use
186
their beliefs about state politics or national party politics when voting.
Haynes goes on to detail how voter desire to influence national politics
allowed political machines to staff state legislatures with party hacks, as
they knew voters would vote based on the Senate election rather than on
187
the candidates running for state legislature.
Further, senatorial

179. See generally Haynes, supra note 28.
180. I Robert Byrd, The Senate 1789–1989: Addresses on the History of the United States
Senate 405 (1988).
181. Haynes, supra note 28, at 153–210, 171. This argument was a little odd, as if direct elections
would reduce the power of candidates who were good politicians.
182. Id. at 180.
183. Id. at 180–81.
184. Id. at 181.
185. Id. at 184.
186. Id. at 185.
187. Id. 185–86.
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appointment stood in the way of states agreeing to redistrict their
188
legislatures to allow for more representative politics in state legislatures.
Senatorial appointment also encouraged national politicians to influence
state politics. Haynes notes that the telegrams from national party leaders
to state officials responsible for appointing senators took “on a dictatorial
189
tone.”
Herman Ames, who surveyed arguments in favor of direct election
as part of an award-winning history of constitutional amendments
written in 1897, also expressed concern about the corrupting influence of
190
senatorial appointments by state legislatures. He notes that proponents
thought that direct election was more democratic, less likely to lead to
corruption or excessive corporate influence, would result in more
191
deserving candidates, and would end deadlocks. He also notes that
“the advocates of popular elections claim that the evils of the present
method, which tend to the introduction of national affairs into State
politics and lead to the election of members of the State legislatures on
192
national instead of local issues, would be diminished.”
These reviews of the literature cite numerous examples of this
theme showing up in the scholarship and popular press of the time, and it
193
takes no great feat to find many others. While it was only one
argument among many, it is clear that the influence national elections
had on state elections was one of the planks of the argument for direct
election. The argument was aided by the clarity of the national party
positions.
The relationship between national party platforms and the need for
direct election is perhaps made clearest in a remarkable editorial in the
Chicago Tribune in 1894. This editorial actually rebuked candidates for
state senator for running on state issues:

188. Id. at 182–84.
189. Id. at 199.
190. IV Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States During the First Century of Its History 63 (1897).
191. Id. at 62–63.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Charles James Fox, Popular Election of U.S. Senators, 27 Arena 455, 461 (1902) (“[T]he
question as to how a person will vote for senators has become an important but illegitimate factor in his
qualification for the state legislature.”); Edwin Maxey, Some Questions of Larger Politics 72 (1905)
(arguing that “members of the legislature are chosen, too frequently not with a view to their fitness to
serve their State in the capacity of legislators, but because they favor this or the other candidate for
United States Senate”); Haynes, supra note 28, at 184 n.4 (“This election of senators by the state
legislatures has insured the subordination of state to federal politics; maintained party divisions that were
natural in the national field in a field (municipal as well as state) where they were uncalled for and
mischievous; made the ‘final end’ of a legislature not the proper affairs of the State, but the election of
state senators in the interest of national party supremacy; constrained the conscience of men to vote for
unworthy candidates for the legislature lest the party at Washington should be imperiled, and in a word,
prepared the way for the absolute domination of the machine as we see it today.” (citation omitted)).
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Do these Democratic State Senators think the voters can be called off
from the national issues involved in the direct election of
Representatives and the indirect election of a Senator to consider only
local questions. That they will drop the Wilson bill and devote their
attention to the establishment of a Police Board in Chicago? That they
will lose their interest in the currency—in the silver question and the
taxation of State bank notes—and become wrapped up in the question
whether the Chicago park boards shall be elective or appointed. . . .
The people are not such fools. They are not such children that they can
be induced to consider the abolition of the Town Assessor system at a
time when they are doubtful whether the Democratic tariff policy will
194
leave them anything which is worth assessing.

Put together, these sources indicate that people during the debates
over direct election were quite worried about the influence that national
issues had on state legislative elections. The documents also show that
leaders linked this to the fact that the parties were national in scope and
ideological in form. The political science literature shows that this was
newly the case around the time the movement for direct election took
off, and that the parties became more national and more ideological as
pressure mounted to change the Constitution to allow for direct election.
While this is not proof that the changes in party form had a clear causal
effect on support for the Seventeenth Amendment, it is highly suggestive
of this.
The next Part analyzes what this relationship reveals about modern
arguments over the Seventeenth Amendment and federalism more
generally.

III. The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism Theory
This Part will discuss the implications of the fight over the
Seventeenth Amendment for how we think about federalism, both in
scholarship and judicial opinions. The history of the Seventeenth
Amendment has substantial and important lessons for how contemporary
federalism works in practice.
A. The Seventeenth Amendment and the Problems of Political
Safeguards of Federalism
Legal scholars have long debated whether and how courts should
195
police the lines of authority provided in the Constitution. Herbert
Weschler, in one of the more famous essays in American legal scholarship,
lays out a strong argument that courts should largely stay out of disputes

194. The Want to Dodge National Issues, Chi. Trib., May 14, 1894.
195. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (describing the “proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States” as “perhaps our oldest question of
constitutional law”).
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196

between the federal government and the states. Weschler argues that,
instead of relying on courts, the Framers created “political safeguards of
federalism” or structural and cultural limits on federal encroachment on
197
state powers. Structures like the Electoral College, the fact that
representatives in the House are allocated by state and not purely by
population, and the very existence of the U.S. Senate, with its equal
198
representation for each state, serve to protect the interests of the states.
This obviates the need for courts to police federal authority. The
Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
relied on Wechsler and others as reason to avoid a heavy-handed review
199
of Congressional authority.
Larry Kramer, in two well-known pieces, rejects Wechsler’s
characterization of the efficacy of the structural protections for states,
200
but argued that there were other political safeguards for federalism.
Federalism, Kramer argues, is the constitutional protection of the
“regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy
201
choices.” The Constitution’s structural provisions may protect interests
that reside in states, but they do not protect the authority of state
governments to legislate against federal encroachment. For instance, the
Electoral College may give ethanol producers in Iowa more influence than
they would have in a system of purely popular elections for President, but
this does little to protect the regulatory authority of the state government
of Iowa.
Kramer claims, however, that there were in fact strong political
202
safeguards for states because politics was organized at the state level.
The Framers understood that the real protections for states were not in
“Wechsler’s tidy, bloodless constitutional structures,” but were rather
provided by “real politics, popular politics: the messy, ticklish stuff that
203
was (and is) the essence of republicanism.” State leaders would drum
up opposition to federal encroachment on their authority and could
count on popular support due to the greater connection with the people

196. Wechsler, supra note 21, at 558–59.
197. See generally id.
198. He notably does not discuss the Seventeenth Amendment at length. See Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1503 (noting the oddity of Weschler’s decision not to
discuss the Seventeenth Amendment extensively).
199. 469 U.S. 528, 550–51, 551 n.11 (1985) (citing Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the
National Political Process 175–84 (1980)).
200. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 221–27; Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1503–15. Kramer also critiques Weschsler’s reliance on “cultural
foundations,” as these were more likely the result of other protections for states, rather than being an
independent source of protection for states. Id.
201. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 222.
202. Id. at 257.
203. Id.
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204

and greater regulatory ambit. The political safeguards of federalism lay
in the political power of state leaders to rally popular support.
The modern version of this is state-based political parties.
Compared with European political parties, American parties have been
less “programmatic”—ideologically coherent and committed to achieving
an ideological agenda—and less “centralized”—run by a top-down
205
national organization. Instead, Kramer argues that America’s parties
206
were largely run by state and local politicians and activists. The power
of state politicians over political parties gave them control over federal
elections, which in turn protected states as institutions, as federal
government overreaching could be punished through use of the party
apparatus in elections.
In the 1990s, when Kramer wrote his two classic pieces, the
weakening of the party system that occurred in the 1970s was already
207
giving way to our currently heavily polarized party system. Kramer
notes that, while the parties may be growing more centralized and
208
programmatic, state parties have retained substantial influence.
Further, a new form of protection has emerged: the states’ role in the
209
administration of federal programs. Because the federal government
relied on state governments to administer its policies, states had all sorts
of protections against excessive federal intrusions.
While the power of states as part of the administrative process has
been substantially fleshed out in recent times and shown to have real
teeth, the story of state parties as political safeguards has not fared as
well because the trend that began before Kramer’s articles has become
210
even more significant.
Today’s political parties have become
substantially more programmatic and centralized. Congress is more
polarized than ever, with the party affiliation defining almost all

204. Id. at 258–66.
205. Id. at 278–87; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1520–42.
206. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 280.
207. Id. at 280–83. See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged
Citizens, Polarization & American Democracy (2010) (cataloging and attempting to explain the
increasing polarization of political parties and elites over the last thirty years); Nolan McCarty et al.,
Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006) (highlighting the history
of polarization in Congress).
208. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 278–89.
209. Id. at 283–87
210. For a small taste of the work on the relationship between states and federal administrative
agencies, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J.
1256, 1275–80 (2009) (discussing how uncooperative behavior by states implementing federal laws
resulted in policy changes); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic
Power, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1225, 1227 (2001) (discussing the influence of state regulators in federal
administrative regimes); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of
Fundamental Rights 90 (2009) (citations omitted) (noting that state participation in federal
regulatory regimes “provides a prime example of the operation of cooperative federalism”).
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variation in congressional voting and with substantial distance between
211
the mean policy preferences of each parties’ legislators. Organizational
control over party strategy has flowed to national organizations like the
congressional campaign committees and Presidential campaigns. Since
the 1970s, each party’s candidates have become more similar to one
212
another ideologically, no matter what type of district they run in.
Presidential candidates are similarly growing more ideologically
213
distinct. There is little evidence that state parties exert any meaningful
control over members of Congress; members are responsive to national
and not local trends and control.
Kramer acknowledges that “parties change constantly,” but also
claims that their decentralization and non-programmatic nature have
214
been relatively constant. From this, he argues that state parties have, at
least until the most contemporary period, consistently provided political
215
safeguards for federalism.
The story of the Seventeenth Amendment shows that political
parties were changing a great deal even prior to the last few decades. The
increased ideological definition and organizational centralization of the
two major parties in the period after 1896 made national politics a more
significant part of state elections, reducing the degree to which state
politicians mattered to election results. The move toward programmatic
and centralized parties in the early part of the twentieth century was not
as dramatic as we would see in the early part of the twenty-first century,
but it represented a decrease in the strength of the non-formal political
safeguards of federalism. As the non-formal safeguards weakened,
support for a formal political safeguard of federalism, the power of state
legislatures to appoint senators, also withered.
Kramer’s arguments about the political safeguards of federalism
have been criticized by modern judicial federalists for failing to
acknowledge that informal safeguards are contingent on the existence of
a particular political order, rather than absolute like the Constitution’s

211. Abramowitz, supra note 207, at 140–44 (describing changes in polarization in Congress);
McCarty et al., supra note 207, at 3; Jacob Jensen et al., Political Polarization and the Dynamics of
Political Language: Evidence from 130 Years of Partisan Speech, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity,
Fall 2012, at 1, 5–6 (analyzing language used in congressional debates to find that polarization increased
for thirty years although at lower rates than during New Deal period and earlier).
212. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 Am. J. Pol.
Sci. 136, 136 (2001).
213. See David Andersen et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential
Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 395, 396–98 (2008) (noting that Presidential candidates have become
more ideologically distinct, leading to voters become better at voting “correctly” or in line with their
ideological preferences).
214. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 21, at 1523.
215. Id. at 1524.
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guarantees. The history of the Seventeenth Amendment provides an
example of how shifts in the political order can affect state governmental
power in the federal legislature. Thus, while the history of the
Seventeenth Amendment provides an important caveat to Kramer’s
arguments about judicial enforcement of federalism, it also provides
substantial support for his analytical claim that we should look to how
political parties function to understand how federalism works.
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Seventeenth
Amendment is less about safeguards and more about the very basic
question of what those safeguards protect. Kramer writes: “federalism is
meant to preserve the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to
217
legislate policy choices.” The next Subpart shows that this elides an
important distinction between state regulatory authority and popular
authority at the state level.
B. The Seventeenth Amendment and the Problem of Conflating
Federalism with State Authority
Scholars and politicians have rather endlessly debated whether
national or state-based solutions to specific policy questions are superior.
There has been a similarly endless debate about whether the
Constitution—either as interpreted by courts or implemented by political
institutions—should do more to protect state policymaking from federal
encroachment, that is, should we have more federalism or more
nationalism. Most of these discussions, as Kramer’s previous quote
suggests, have either clearly stated or tacitly assumed that increasing and
protecting state regulatory authority—including the power of state
entities to make policy decisions—is what federalism protects from
218
encroachment by the federal government. The idea that federalism

216. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 115–16 (2001).
217. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back, supra note 21, at 222.
218. Perhaps the clearest expositor of this view is Ernie Young. In his terrific article, The
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, Young argues that functional arguments in favor of federalism
should be understood to protect state autonomy and not state sovereignty, or rather than sovereignty,
or separation and protection from national authority. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 50–52 (2004) (“[I]t makes sense to look to the underlying values that
federalism is generally thought to serve. . . . They tend to fall into two loose groups. The first is
concerned with regulatory outcomes: Federalism permits a diversity of regulatory regimes from state
to state, which may allow satisfaction of more people’s preferences, regulatory experimentation, and
competition among states to provide the most attractive regime. The second group has to do with the
political process itself: State governments provide a check on national overreaching, foster political
competition and participation, and may even help build social capital. Autonomy, not sovereignty,
provides the common theme of all these arguments. Just having state governments is not enough;
those governments need to have meaningful things to do. Federalism cannot provide regulatory
diversity unless states have autonomy to set divergent policies; state governments cannot provide fora
for political participation and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora. The
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equals state authority or autonomy, whether it is enforced by courts or
protected by the institutional design of the federal government, is almost
219
universal.
Something subtly different emerges, however, when one considers
the equally endless and unbelievably varied normative justifications for
federalism. Most normative justifications for federalism rely on an
assumption that state majorities will be able to use elections to promote
their policy preferences. That is, the benefits that run from having a
federal system are dependent, in part, on the functioning of state
220
democracy.
It may seem safe to assume that the power of state officials to enact
policies and the power of majorities inside the state to choose policies are
the same. After all, state government officials are elected by majority
vote. However, the history of the Seventeenth Amendment shows us is
that, under certain conditions, there are powers states can hold that
reduce the capacity of state voters—real and not hypothesized voters, full
of warts and empty of some important relevant political knowledge—to
affect policy decisions at the state level. Thus, increasing state power in
some instances can actually reduce the benefits of federalism.

sovereignty model of the Rehnquist Court’s working majority on federalism issues, by contrast, has
emphasized the separate and independent existence of the states, as if mere existence were the primary
value to be preserved. The Court’s focus on the states’ sovereign immunity from private lawsuits, for
example, has expended much time and political capital on an issue that has little to do with what functions
remain for state governments to perform.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Young fails to note that there is a distinction between state autonomy and making state policy
responsive to state majorities. And that the latter principle is responsible for the normative arguments
in favor of federalism, in ways that increased autonomy can sometimes inhibit.
219. There are some exceptions. Most notable is the work of John McGinnis and Ilya Somin. See
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal
System, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 89, 89–92 (2004). Taking off from the well-known section from New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–182 (1992), which argued that federalism sometimes had to be protected
from state officials who would rather cede responsibility to the federal government, McGinnis and Somin
lay out a full-throated argument that state autonomy and federalism are substantially different. Id. at 90.
While Somin and McGinnis do not focus on the formal bounds of connection between state governments
and the federal government, like state legislative appointment of senators.
220. One potential objection must be noted. Malcolm Feely and Edward Rubin distinguish
federalism as a theory from local democracy largely on the grounds that “federalism reserves
particular issues to subnational governmental units, regardless of the political process that exists within
these units.” Malcolm M. Feely & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic
Compromise 31 (2008). I do not disagree with this statement, at least in theory, as it is not difficult to
imagine federal systems with major non-democratic elements (for instance, with provinces run by
unelected tribal chieftains). But for Rubin and Feely, federalism exists to protect distinct political
identities. In systems where state-based political identities are expressed democratically (as in the
American system, where states must provide republican government), the case for federalism does rely on
the quality of local democracy, and the benefits of federalism are eroded by giving states powers that limit
the ability of locals to choose local policies.
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This is broadly true across most normative theories of federalism.
For instance, the benefits of federalism that flow from the smaller size of
states as polities, and the theoretical improved responsiveness of policy
to majority preference that results from this smaller size, will not appear
if state-based voters make their decisions based on national issues.
Giving states control over national political results can make state
elections more second order, and hence less responsive to state opinion
on state issues. Sorting, or Tieboutian, theories of the benefits of
federalism rely on states providing many different choices for mobile
222
citizens.
If the Constitution forces national decisions on state
legislatures, this could result in a reduction in the differences between
state policies, as they take, for instance, either Democratic or Republican
form and do not provide a wide range of choices. The legislatures
running “laboratories of democracy” will experiment less if they get little
electoral credit for successful innovations. If state legislative elections
turn largely on a race for a senator, there is little reason for state
legislators to bother with innovative, costly to devise, and risky new
223
ideas. Theorists who argue that federalism can help solve the conflicts
that arise from the existence of geographically specific cultural
differences in big countries, like Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feely, need
state politics to express local identity, which can be frustrated if the
constitutional organization leads to state voters making national
224
decisions when choosing state legislatures. The benefits of interjurisdictional synergy through “cooperative” or “uncooperative”
federalism rely on the existence of inter-jurisdictional differences and
225
competencies. And so, normative justifications for federalism rely on
226
the quality of state democracy.
221. For a nice summary and categorization of theories of federalism, see generally Erin Ryan, The
Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism: The Tug of War Within, in The Ways of
Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain (Alberto
López-Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San Epifanio eds., 2013).
222. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956) (arguing that diffusing power to many local governments will produce an optimal provision of
local public services under some conditions).
223. The term laboratory of democracy derives from New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593, 594 (1980) (arguing that
limited electoral incentives for state officials results in suboptimal amount of state policy innovation).
224. Feely & Rubin, supra note 220, at 15–38.
225. Schapiro, supra note 210, at 45 (providing an argument for benefits of federalism that flow
from “cooperative” or “symphonic” inter-jurisdictional synergy). See generally Bulman-Pozen &
Gerken, supra note 210 (providing an argument that federalism promotes benefits from
“uncooperative federalism” or inter-jurisdictional conflict).
226. An exception might be drawn for checks and balances theories of federalism, or arguments
that the reason to give states power is that it limits the ability of national majorities to push their
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This has a number of implications. First and foremost, advocates of
repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, from scholars like Zywicki and
John Yoo to jurists like Justice Scalia to politicians like Rick Perry, do so
because they think that repeal would enhance the values associated with
227
federalism. They are wrong. Although state elections still turn heavily
on national issues, repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would make
state elections turn on national issues to an even greater degree. This
would reduce the quality of state democracy and thus reduce the quality
228
of American federalism.
policies absent widespread agreement. Even if state elections are merely another sphere in which
national politics expresses itself, the existence of many states each with some degree of autonomy
means that it will be more difficult for a national majority to achieve its objectives. Even if this is the
case, the effect of giving states powers that render their elections second order has a somewhat
ambiguous effect on checks and balances. If a President is elected with coattails, then he and the national
government will have greater power if state elections follow national ones. State officials elected because
of the President (and who will be reelected only if the President is popular) will have incentives to push
the President’s agenda in areas where Congress cannot legislate due to constitutional constraints or a
sheer lack of time and resources. However, where the President’s party is rejected in off-term state
elections, as is often the case, his power will diminish and there will be greater checks on federal power.
Thus, giving states control over national entities like the Senate, which encourages state elections to be
second order, will affect the strength of checks and balances in the system. Having state elections turn on
state issues will mean a more steady check on the power of national officials. As we are particularly
worried about the existence of checks following landslide elections (when other checks are not
available), the effect of second-order elections on checks and balances is likely negative, even if there
are times when second-order elections increase checks on the presidency.
227. See Rick Perry, Fed Up! Our Fight to Save Washington 42–44 (2011); Zywicki, Beyond the
Shell, supra note 2, at 166; John Yoo, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, The Corner: Nat’l Rev.
Online (Oct. 22, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/250726/repeal-17thamendment-john-yoo.
228. It should be noted that this requires a simplifying assumption that voter preferences are either
separable (their voting preference at the state level is not conditional on who is in charge at the
national level) or non-separable in a way that does not create a “doctrinal paradox.” See generally
Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 687 (2010). To the extent preferences are separable, state democracy would be
made worse off by repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, as voters could not use state elections to
hold state officials accountable without it affecting their preferences in federal elections. If state voters
care more about federal policy or the party system is organized in ways to make choosing in federal
elections easier, then state democracy will suffer. However, if preferences at the state and national
level are non-separable, there are certain preference orders that would result in voters being either
better served or no worse served by linkages between the two types of elections. It is not difficult to
imagine such preferences. For instance, before a voter supports a high-tax party at the state level, she
may want to ensure a low-tax party is in charge at the national level. If preferences take this form,
choosing state and federal officials separately can lead to a negative outcome for some voters (in the
example above, high or low tax parties in charge at both levels). This is an application of the “doctrinal
paradox” identified by Lewis Kornhauser and Larry Sager. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G.
Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 10–13 (1993); see
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986).
But the assumption here is a modest one. First, non-separability of preferences only harms the normative
conclusion that the Seventeenth Amendment was bad for state democracy if preferences in the electorate
take a form where they are prone to cycling results and parties behave in a specific way, following the
platforms they announce even if things change at another level of government. Given that much voter
assessment is retrospective based on holding incumbent officials responsible for results rather than
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Second, other institutional rules that link federal representation to
state legislative elections also reduce the benefits of federalism. Franita
Tolson argues that partisan gerrymandering is a “safeguard of
229
federalism.”
She argues that states can use their power over
230
congressional districting to protect their interests. Like arguments
made by supporters of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment, Tolson’s
claim ignores the harm that linking levels of government can cause to
state politics. Because states have the power to gerrymander, federal
officials, organizations, and interest groups all become heavily involved
in state elections prior to redistricting, flooding state elections with
231
outside money, all in the name of affecting Congress. Gerrymandering,
like state legislative appointment of senators, turns state legislative
elections into proxy fights for control of Congress, reducing the
accountability of state officials for state policy. The power to
gerrymander, thus, reduces the quality of state democracy and hence the
benefits of federalism.
Even more commonly, the federal government shares responsibility
in some policy areas with state governments. Rather than implementing
its own policy, the federal government engages in “cooperative
federalism,” and in doing so achieves certain benefits, including greater
local tailoring of policies, mixing the differing competencies of state and
federal governments, and gaining legitimacy and efficacy from the
232
involvement of state actors. Such mixing of responsibility also allows
for “uncooperative federalism,” for which state officials use their
involvement in policy areas to dissent, thus creating new nodes for
233
political disagreement and better public debate.
But sharing
responsibility across types of government has a cost in terms of its effect
promises, state officials have strong incentives to produce positive results for voters, which requires
taking into account what is happening at other levels of government. Further, state legislative elections
in the pre-1913 world did not determine more than a little about the makeup of federal power; state
legislatures each only chose two senators (and one at a time), and had no direct effect on the House or
the President. Thus, even fully informed voters with non-separable preferences should have in most
instances voted as if their preferences were separable as the practical effect of the linkage was small.
Finally, it is unlikely that voters could develop enough information about candidates, parties, and policy
interactions between the state and federal level to operationalize a set of non-separable preferences (even
though the mere fact that voters behave naively and not strategically does not eliminate the possibility
that they were in fact made worse off by breaking the link between the Senate and state legislature). As a
result, the assumption that the doctrinal paradox does not seriously imperil this normative claim, but it
is an assumption. Thanks to Michael Gilbert for forcing me to think about this.
229. See generally Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism,
2010 Utah L. Rev. 859.
230. Id. at 860.
231. As Michael Kang notes, “the most aggressive offensive gerrymanders during the recent cycle of
congressional redistricting occurred after energetic intervention by federal-level party leaders.” Michael
S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 443, 465 (2005).
232. See Schapiro, supra note 210, at 45.
233. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 210, at 1259.
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on accountability. Research shows that voters have some ability,
although not a great deal, to assign responsibility to different levels of
234
government. Where possible, voters can use elections at each level to
hold officials accountable for the effect of policies they have enact.
Where policy responsibility is mixed, however, it is more difficult for
voters to use elections at any level to hold officials accountable. As John
McGinnis and Ilya Somin posit, this harms the efficacy of federalism
235
across a number of dimensions.
This discussion further problematizes Kramer’s theory of the
236
political safeguards of federalism. Kramer argues that interaction
between state parties and national politics protects the values of
federalism by protecting state authority. Interaction between national
and state parties, however, can result in weakening the ability of state
voters to control state policy. Thus, the very safeguards Kramer finds for
the formal authority of states can reduce the functional benefits of
237
federalism.
C. Can State Democracy Work?
This story of the Seventeenth Amendment has an ironic ending. If a
goal of the Amendment was to reduce the influence voter preferences

234. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 404–05.
235. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 219, at 109–12.
236. James Gardner wrestles with some similar questions about Kramer’s work in a recent draft.
James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties and the National
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & Pol. 1, 58–59 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191150. However, Gardner does not explain the mechanisms through which
national politics influences state politics, except to note that parties are involved. Id.
237. It may, however, serve to improve the democratic process at the federal level. In a recent
paper, Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that second-order elections at the state level may be good for
national politics, as the minority party at the national level will have, through its control of state
governments, avenues through which it can provide actual examples of how alternatives to the
majority party’s approach will work, and opportunities to frustrate the majority party’s agenda
through “uncooperative federalism.” Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev.
1077, 1105–08 (2014). Voters using state elections to comment on national politics are thus, BulmanPozen argues, providing a democratic good—making federal politics work better by having a more
efficacious check on majority party power. Id. at 1191 n.192. Bulman-Pozen’s work is challenging and
fascinating, but the costs of whatever improvement the existence of second-order elections at the state
level provides to national level discourse are quite high. As argued above, second-order state elections
reduce or eliminate accountability for state level officials, reduce the variation in state policy and thus
harm the benefits from sorting and choice of law, and harm the degree to which state policies follow
state voter preferences, at least to the extent that states are doing things other than merely rearguing
national issues. Although states and the federal government do deal with some issues in common, the
most important national issues—such as war and peace, monetary policy, and deficit spending—have
no state policy analogues (states are generally barred from any of these issue areas by the
Constitution, federal laws, or state constitutions). Thus, it is difficult to see this benefit to federal
democratic discourse as more than a small offset to the costs to society of having second-order state
elections.
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about national politics had on state elections, it has largely failed.
Consider this chart:

Figure 1: Democratic Seat Change in State House
238
and U.S. House Elections

When Democrats or Republicans are popular and do well in national
elections, they usually win elections at the state legislative level as well.
Despite the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislative
elections still largely turn on federal issues.
If the Seventeenth Amendment was intended in part to separate
state politics from national politics, then why did it not succeed? Perhaps
the reason is the existing bond between states and the national
government, like the power to gerrymander, but I doubt this has more
than a small effect. More likely, the information provided on the ballot
linking national and state politics explains the failure of the Seventeenth
Amendment to separate state and national politics. The Seventeenth
Amendment focused on the structural constitutional connection between

238. This chart was prepared by Steven Rogers and it and the underlying data is available upon request.
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state governments and the national government created by state
legislative appointment of senators. But what makes state legislative
elections substantially second order are the laws and politics that create a
unified party system.
The source of second-order elections is frequently “mismatch” in
the party system. Today more than ever, parties are defined by the
239
national political commitments of their candidates and members.
Voters see the endorsement of these national coalitions on the ballot,
and because voters know little about individual candidates, it is rational
to use these heuristics about national politics in state and local elections
if there is any correlation at all between national and local preferences.
The result is what we see in the chart above—voters use their
preferences about the President and Congress to determine their vote for
state legislature or city council. At the local level, this is particularly
dramatic; the correlations between national and local voting can be
240
extremely high. In state legislative elections, there is some evidence
that some voters care somewhat about the actual performance of the
state legislature; this influence is more pronounced if voters actually
know which party is in the majority. But as Steven Rogers has shown, the
largest influence by far on state legislative elections is the approval rate
241
of the President. The dominance of national parties in many states
means there are a large number of uncompetitive state legislatures.
Accountability and representation in state government suffer as a
result. One might think that when a state that, say, is largely Republican at
the national level chooses a largely Republican state legislature, the quality
of representation—the degree to which voter preferences are translated
into policies—is relatively high. This would be a mistake. An absence of
competition at a level of government means little accountability based on
performance for the actions of incumbent officials. While high profile
governors face retrospective evaluation on the performance of state
economies, the low salience of state legislative races means that they face
242
few consequences when the policies they enact go badly. Further,
primary elections are low-information affairs, as voters do not have
access to high-value heuristics like party labels in primaries. There is thus

239. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 402. See generally Schleicher, City Council
Elections, supra note 19; Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19; David Schleicher, I Would but I
Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Limits Big City Corruption, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 277, 288
(2010) [hereinafter Schleicher, I Would but I Need the Eggs].
240. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 420, 458–59.
241. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 22–24.
242. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 398–400 (discussing differences between
Gubernatorial and state legislative elections).
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little reason to believe that these state legislatures are responsive to
243
differences or changes in preferences among majority party supporters.
Also, the issue areas in which state governments and the federal
government make policy are at least somewhat distinct. Although there
are many policy areas in which the policy responsibilities overlap in this
era of cooperative federalism, issues that dominate national politics and
drive voter party identification often have no local analogue. For
instance, states are either barred by the Constitution, state constitutions,
or preemption by federal law, or have largely been edged out by
comprehensive federal policy in policy areas like counter-cyclical deficit
spending, monetary policy, war-making, trade, treaty making, and
244
healthcare and social security for retirees. Further, the mobility of
residents and capital puts some limits on the ability of states to engage in
the type of redistributive taxing and spending that is possible at the
national level, although the strength of these limits is more limited than
245
many suggest.
In many of the most important areas of state
governmental policymaking, the federal government is a junior partner,
like private law subjects, land use, family law, criminal law, and,
246
traditionally at least, education. While voters’ preferences on state
policies are surely correlated with their preferences about national
policies, there is no reason to think that they are the same.
As a result, there is little reason to expect that state elections that
are responsive to national trends will produce particularly representative
state policies. And in fact they do not. In the leading recent paper in the
field, Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips find that opinion majorities among
state residents on specific issues are no more likely to have their
preferences chosen by state government than if policies were chosen at
247
random. Even opinions held by super majorities of the state population

243. For an extensive discussion of the problem of voter ignorance inside party primaries, see
generally id.
244. See generally Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The
Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 187 (2010) (stating
that states are generally barred by their constitutions from engaging in counter-cyclical deficit
spending); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544 (2010) (discussing
how Social Security and Medicare are exclusive federal programs); see also Ernest A. Young, Dual
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139,
145 (2001) (discussing how treaties, trade, and monetary policy are exclusively granted to the federal
government).
245. See generally Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19 (reviewing literature on effect of
mobility on local redistributive spending, and arguing that agglomeration economies allow even local
governments to engage in substantial redistribution); Schleicher, I Would but I Need the Eggs, supra note 239.
246. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Stephen Breyer,
Judicial Review: A Practising Judge’s Perspective, 19 O.J.L.S. 153, 154 (1999) (“[T]he 50 states, not the
federal government, are responsible for much of American law, including family law, property law,
contract law, tort law, most criminal law, and most other commercial law.”).
247. Lax & Phillips, supra note 22, at 149.
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win in state legislatures barely more than sixty percent of the time.
State legislative elections just do not produce particularly accountable or
representative government, and this is largely a result of the fact that
state elections turn on national, rather than state-specific issues and
performance.
These facts contradict a basic application of Anthony Downs’s wellknown median-voter theorem. Downsian models assume that a party
that is not in power—say Massachusetts Republicans or Wyoming
Democrats—will adopt policy positions on state issues that appeal to
249
50.01% of the voting public and therefore become competitive. So why
don’t state parties that lose virtually all state legislative elections, like
Massachusetts Republicans or Wyoming Democrats, do so and reap
electoral rewards? Downsian models are inconsistent with what we
perceive in the world, levels of government where there is an effectively
permanent lack of partisan competition. In a series of papers, I have
developed three explanations: laws that inhibit rebranding, voter difficulty
in differentiating parties at different levels of government, and an
imbalance of voters who form their party preference on non-ideological
grounds.
First, laws limit the development of differentiated local and state
parties. In order to operate like a party in a median voter model, the
minority party must be able to adopt a clear platform on issues relevant to
the office that appeal to the median voter. Election laws make this
difficult. State laws often limit the ability of voters to belong to different
250
parties at different levels of government or switch easily back and forth.
Laws frequently also require primary elections, and as a result, a local
minority party will face difficulties fielding a consistent and competitive
slate of candidates, as the party’s primary electorate and candidate base is
likely to be comprised entirely of voters on a distant fringe of the
municipality’s ideological spectrum. Further, where the issues that are
decided by the state or local government are orthogonal to or only weakly
correlated with the main dimension of national politics, there is no reason
to believe that a primary electorate and candidate base determined by
national preferences will be able to agree on local or state policies that
251
would appeal to the jurisdiction’s median voter. The base of, say, the
Republican Party of New York City is unlikely to be able to field a set of
ideologically coherent and competitive candidates across offices, as it is

248. Id.
249. See Anthony Downs, supra note 133, at 114–49 (1957).
250. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 448–60. Also parties earn automatic
ballot access for down-ballot races—including races for city offices—through a strong showing in the
gubernatorial race. Id. at 450, 450 n.108. This makes it difficult for third-party entrants, as they have to
pass an established party in order to become one of the top two vote getters.
251. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 404–06.
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likely too far to the right for the average New York resident on issues that
correlate with national politics and too unorganized on issues that do
252
not. As a result, the party cannot build a locally competitive brand and
voters use their national preferences in local non-mayoral elections.
At the local level, there is substantial evidence that the major parties
do not behave like median-voter parties. Instead, a party is only weakly
253
correlated with local issue preference. At the state level, some parties
254
have made efforts at rebranding themselves on state issues. But even
where state-issue rebranding occurs, it frequently does not seem to matter.
For instance, based on survey data of legislators and voters, Massachusetts
Republican legislators have issue stances that are very close to those of the
255
256
median Massachusetts voter. And yet they lose badly every election.
257
The second and third examples may help explain this. Voters may
not know state legislative party issue stances and may have substantial
difficulty figuring them out. In order to vote retrospectively, voters have
to know which party is in power and what policies they decide. Voters at
the state level often fail at both of these tasks. First, figuring out who is
responsible for different policies between federal, state and local officials is
258
frequently quite difficult for voters. Second, state voters frequently do
not know which party is in power in the state, making retrospective voting
259
on state issues difficult. Third, where one party has dominated politics
for a long time, this becomes particularly difficult. Voters have no basis for
assessing a long-term minority party’s promises and may simply not
260
believe them when they say they will behave like the state median voter.
Finally, differences among voters may explain the failures of state
democracy. Since the 1950s, we have known that some voters’

252. Id.
253. This is despite the fact that voters frequently have relatively clearly organized preferences on
local issues. See generally Boudreau et al., supra note 146 (finding that San Francisco voters have
preferences on local issues that fall into two camps but that these preferences do not translate into voting
patterns); see also Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 396–98 (arguing that local parties have little
coherent ideology); Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 19, at 439–43 (same).
254. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 400.
255. See generally Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures and
Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels
(Jan. 20,
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697352.
256. Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 400.
257. See id. at 396–99.
258. For anyone, in fact. David Schleicher, From Here All-the-Way-Down, or How to Write a
Festschrift Piece, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 401, 415 n.12 (2012) (“Voter ignorance is not a problem of a
benighted ‘they,’ but rather is a problem for all of us who live in the real world with its competing
demands; requirements that we feed ourselves, and the like. If you show me someone who has deeply
and truly studied each choice they have to make when voting, I will show you someone who is not all
that busy.”).
259. See Rogers, supra note 18, at 4.
260. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 401.
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relationships to political parties are not primarily ideological or based on
261
retrospective assessments of party performance. Rather, they have
affective relationships with parties. These voters are members of parties
first and their membership defines their ideology and positions on issues.
Party affiliation is like a religion, not an expression of the sum of issue
preferences. At the national level, this may not matter much; as long as
there are a roughly equal number of non-responsive Democrats and
262
Republicans, their voting patterns should wash out. But at the local
level, if the rates of voters among Democrats and Republicans that are
non-responsive to issues are equal, a big difference in national party
membership can make local competition difficult. If a state is sixty percent
Republican, and half of all voters are purely affective, in order to win a
majority of the vote, a Democrat would need to win sixty percent of all
voters who pay attention to state governmental performance, a tall order.
All of these forces likely work together to ensure that voting for
state legislature is more responsive to national politics than it is to
anything state legislatures actually do. Notably, campaigns for a highprofile office like governor or mayor can buck this trend, as candidates
263
for these offices can develop their own brand in voters’ minds. In fact
we see competition in gubernatorial and mayoral races, even when we
see no competition in the state legislatures and city councils in the same
jurisdiction. But down-ballot races are defined by these dynamics.
Having state legislatures appoint senators likely made this worse, as
it gave voters, including those conscious of the differences between state
and national responsibility and state and national party stances, another
reason to use their national preferences in state elections. Even if a voter
is fully informed, she may just care more about the identity of a senator
than the policies of the state government. But without state legislative
appointment of senators, preferences about national politics—the
popularity of the President and Congress—play the lead role in
determining the results of state legislative elections. As a result, state
legislative elections do not make state legislators accountable for their
actions or responsive to the preferences of state voters on state issues.
State democracy just does not work that well.
Further, state legislatures end up featuring the pathologies of national
politics. Congress has, over the last three decades, become extremely
polarized, both in terms of distinction between the parties and ideological
264
distance between the preferences of each party’s median voter. While

261. Id. at 363, 398. Again, this is not a problem about “some voters” but rather something that
describes all of our behavior to some degree. Id. at 363.
262. Id. at 336. Or rather, if Democrats and Republicans are equally tribal.
263. Id. at 359–60.
264. See Abramowitz, supra note 207, at 140–44 (describing changes in polarization in Congress);
McCarty et al., supra note 207, at 3.
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there is a long debate about the causes of polarization, there are widely
acknowledged costs and benefits. As E.E. Schattschneider and the
“responsible party government” school of scholars argued in the 1950s,
polarization makes voting decisions easier for voters, particularly lowinformation ones, leading to stronger links between preferences and vote
decisions, and allows majority parties to overcome institutional and
constitutional roadblocks to policymaking during periods of one-party
265
governance. On the other hand, polarization means that during periods
of one-party governance, policies may be far from the preferences of the
median voter, executive power may be largely unchecked, changes in
power may result in wild swings in policy, and agreement between parties
may be more difficult when control of the presidency and at least one
266
branch of Congress is split.
As Congress has polarized, state legislatures generally have as well,
although there is substantial variation among them. More than half of
state legislatures are more polarized than Congress, and polarization is
267
increasing in a majority of state legislative houses. But state legislatures
face very different institutional problems than Congress. States generally
lack (or have to a lesser degree) many of the institutional burdens that
polarized federal parties help overcome, like strongly entrenched
bureaucracies, legislative rules like the filibuster, and fixed constitutional
impediments. Further, as discussed above, there is little reason to believe
that clearer choices between state legislative parties matter very much to
voters. The result is that state legislatures can suffer the pathologies of
polarization—non-median voter policy results in periods of one-party
265. See generally Austin Ranney, Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System: A
Commentary, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 488 (1951); E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (1942).
For a discussion of the responsible party government school and of the benefits of polarization for
voters, see Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 373–74, 382–83. For a recent paper in this vein,
see generally David R. Jones, Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House
Elections, 52 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 323 (2010) (stating that polarization increases the degree to which
majority party incumbents are held accountable for voter dislike of Congress).
266. For summaries and discussions of the costs of polarization to the federal government, see
generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (2011); Nicol C. Rae, Be Careful What You Wish For:
The Rise of Responsible Parties in American National Politics, 10 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 169 (2007).
267. See Boris Shor, Polarization Trends in American State Legislatures by Chamber, Measuring
Am. Legislatures (July 26, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/2013/07/26/polarization-trends-inamerican-state-legislatures-by-chamber; Boris Shor, State Legislatures and Polarization, Measuring
Am. Legislatures (May 21, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/2013/05/21/state-legislatures-andpolarization; Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, Ideological Mapping of American State Legislature,
105 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 530, 540 (2011). A large percentage (although not all) of the less-polarized state
legislatures are extremely uncompetitive, with the ten least polarized including states like New Jersey
(where control over a house of the legislature last occurred in 1969), Hawaii (1963), and Massachusetts
(1958). The ten least polarized legislatures are in order Louisiana, Rhode Island, Nebraska (which has
non-partisan elections but has factions that are increasing in polarization), West Virginia, Delaware,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New Jersey. Michael J. Dubin, Party
Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary 1796–2006 (2007).
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control, wild swings when power changes hands, and extreme lockups
during periods of mixed control—without any of the corresponding
benefits. The form taken by national political parties is a response to the
needs and demands of national politics, but their structure extends into
the states to the detriment of state politics.
The failure of the Seventeenth Amendment to make state democracy
work substantially better suggests that reformers were using the wrong
tools. We see the phenomenon of second-order elections under a whole
variety of different institutional structures, from U.S. states to big cities to
European Parliament elections. When reformers attempt to change this
dynamic, as they frequently do, they usually focus on formal ties between
the levels of government, or the powers allocated to each. The European
Union, for instance, has repeatedly increased the power of the European
Parliament in the faint hope that at some point it will become powerful
268
enough that voters pay attention to what it does. Faced with a problem
of how elections work, the proposed solutions are constitutional in form.
An alternative would be to focus on the mechanics of elections.
Elections are not pure representations of voter choice, but are rather
269
structured by laws to achieve certain purposes. If reformers want state
elections to serve the purpose of making state officials accountable for
their performance, they would need to design election laws that provide
voters with information and structure voter choices in ways aimed at that
end. One can imagine all sorts of changes, ranging from the quotidian—
like labeling which party holds a majority of the seats in the state
legislature on the ballot—to the major, like barring national parties from
contesting state elections, allowing state specific parties to rise up and
270
contest these elections. But the focus should be on developing election
rules that shape party competition to produce outcomes that fit the goal
inherent in holding the election in the first place. We hold state
legislative elections, presumably, in order to get feedback from state
voters on state governmental performance. Our election law rules do not
ensure that state elections serve this purpose.
Rather than changing the constitutional structure, we need to look at
how we regulate state elections. By doing this, we might be able to fulfill
the Seventeenth Amendment’s promise and make state democracy work.

268. See Schleicher, What if Europe, supra note 19, at 110–15.
269. Paul Edelman illustrates this point nicely by showing that voting for Best Picture in the
Oscars is unexplainable were the only goal to represent voters’ preferences, but that the voting system
exists to achieve other ends (in this case, ratings for the Oscar’s broadcast.) See generally Paul H.
Edelman, The Institutional Dimension of Election Design (Vanderbilt Public Law, Research Paper
No. 11-18, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819306.
270. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 19, at 50–72 (imagining all sorts of changes, including
ones of dubious constitutionality like the one discussed above).
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Conclusion
This Article has shown that one of the animating reasons for the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment was a desire to remove
consideration of national politics from state legislative elections. It has
also shown that it did not succeed in doing so. Our challenge is to
consider both how this goal might be achieved and how failure to do so—
either because reforms are unsuccessful or not attempted—should
change our expectations and understandings of federalism.

